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I. INTRODUCTION 
The law of restitution regulates a major area of litigation, but in Texas 
and elsewhere, this law suffers from a significant degree of confusion. 
Before becoming the reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
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Unjust Enrichment (Restatement (Third)), Andrew Kull noted how United 
States lawyers and judges suffer from a misunderstanding of the law of 
restitution. 1 That misunderstanding significantly affects litigation because 
one cannot comprehensively describe the body of court-made rights and 
remedies without including the law ofrestitution.2 
These misunderstandings arise, in part, from the continued use of 
terminology laden with ancient fictions. Like the law of torts and contracts, 
the law of restitution imposes civil liability and provides distinctive 
remedies to address that liability. Unlike torts and contracts, restitution has 
not benefited from the general acceptance and simplification of the 
definitions on which its concepts rest. The publication in 2011 of the 
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) should help to diminish this 
uncertainty in the future. 3 Nevertheless, litigators in many states, including 
Texas, must continue to struggle through what remains an unnecessarily 
mysterious body of law. This Article seeks in part to reduce that mystery 
and to find the common themes in relevant Texas rulings. 
The Texas Supreme Court appears to have adopted the modem view of 
restitution, but its rulings lack the detailed guidance needed by lower courts. 
This Article therefore concl.udes with suggestions that the Texas Supreme 
Court should establish an independent and generally applicable cause of 
action for unjust enrichment, describe clearly the elements of that cause of 
action, and lend its authority to the modem terms that describe the law of 
restitution. None of these suggestions requires a radical departure by the 
Texas Supreme Court from what it has already established in restitution 
cases. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 
Most state judicial systems began adjudicating private disputes by 
using some part of the court-made law developed in the common law and 
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equity courts of England. The two judicial systems that grew in England-
the common law courts and those of equity--each created substantive law 
and distinctive remedies. 
The courts of the common law, for example, created the substantive 
law of tort and contract, and the remedy characteristic of these causes of 
action has long been the award of damages-a monetary judgment 
measured by the plaintiffs losses. On the other hand, the common law 
courts developed increasingly rigid procedural forms of action that imposed 
limiting and strictly enforced requirements on pleading. The courts of 
equity became established in England as an alternative forum and lawmaker 
because of the rigidity of the common law forms of action and the problems 
caused by the common law courts' use of a jury. The courts of equity 
developed the law of trusts and mortgages and created their own unique 
remedy-the injunction. The injunction provided an effective remedy when 
damages were not helpful or adequate, and equity courts wielded the 
powerful sanction of contempt to punish those who disobeyed their 
injunctions. 
As early as 1845, Texas merged the two systems represented by the 
common law and equity courts.4 At least after that time, a Texas court could 
apply any pertinent substantive law or remedy without regard to the system 
from which it was derived.5 Texas courts also avoided the strict pleading 
requirements that characterized the common law forms of action, but 
adopted England's court-made law, either from the common law or equity 
courts, as rules of decision unless these were inconsistent with the Texas 
Constitution or with a Texas statute. 6 
Lawyers today often think of the common law as a reference to court-
made, as opposed to statutory, law. However, all of the rules and. remedies 
created in the common law and equity courts are court-made law in this 
sense. Although the English court-made law pertaining to restitution 
differed because of the characteristics and rationalizations of these two 
court systems, both the common law and the equity courts created 
substantive law to prevent unjust enrichment. In seeking to achieve this 
substantive end, however, each applied its own distinctive remedies and its 
own justifications for the expansion of its judicial power. 
4. Michael Ariens, Lone Star Law: A Legal History of Texas 251 (20 11). 
5. See Rogers v. Daniel Oil & Royalty Co., 110 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1937); see also 
Joseph Webb McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TEx. L. 
REV. 24, 31-32 (1960); Robert W. Stayton, Texas ' Approaches to the Parker Ideal and Her 
Shortcomings, 37 TEX. L. REV. 845, 845 (1_959). 
6. See Towner v. Sayre, 4 Tex. 28, 29 (1849); Knebel v. Capital Nat'! Bank of Austin, 505 
S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex. Civ. App.- Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1974); 
see also McKnight, supra note 5, at 26. 
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A. The Common Law and Quasi-Contracts 
Rather than creating a right or obligation and then the judicial 
procedure for its enforcement, the common law courts created substantive 
law through the design of their procedures. In particular, their requirements 
for pleading effectively described the rights and obligations that were 
legally enforceable. By the seventeenth century, the common law courts had 
developed their assumpsit form of action. This form of action initially 
allowed suits and remedies only for the enforcement of express contracts, 
but was subsequently extended to contracts inferred from the circumstances, 
the so-called implied-in-fact contract.7 This "special" assumpsit form was 
later expanded to authorize judicial enforcement of what had been the 
action in debt, which became known as a claim in indebitatus assumpsit. 8 
Although a debt resembles a contract, the early rules treated it as a property 
right and required the creditor to bring an action in debt in the Common 
Pleas court where a plaintiff made his case subject to an odd method of 
proof called the wager of law.9 These expansions gave the common law 
courts comprehensive power over what we know today as contract law. 
In some cases, however, the defendant gained a benefit at the 
plaintiffs expense but had hot done so through a binding agreement. The 
common law judges used their ingenuity to create legal fictions that 
justified, or perhaps shielded, the expansion of their judicial authority over 
these cases. For example, one who received money through a mistaken 
payment by the plaintiff was made liable for a fictional debt, thus allowing 
the common law courts to avoid the unjustified enrichment of a defendant 
by imposing, as a matter of law, a promise to repay the debt. 10 This fictional 
promise to pay was then used to create a right resembling the right derived 
from actual contracts. The manufactured similarity of these "quasi-
contracts" was deemed sufficient to fit such cases within the assumpsit form 
of action, but the new actions were distinguished by being labeled general 
assumpsit. 11 
A plaintiff used general assumpsit to obtain restitution from a 
defendant who unjustly held a benefit gained at the plaintiffs expense. 
Restitution thus resembled the repayment of a debt, except the debt was a 
7. See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 4.2(3), at 
579 (2d ed. 1993). 
8. See id. at 578- 79. 
9. See id. at 577. This Monty-Pythonesque method of proof depended on the ability of a 
litigant to swear convincingly that the case against him was groundless. As it developed in 
complexity, the wager required swearing by friends or associates of a party ("compurgators"). See 
also Black's Law Dictionary 1574 (7th ed. 1999) (defining wager of law). 
10. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 7, § 4.2(3), at 580. 
11. See id. at 579. 
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creation of law rather than of the parties. In order to maintain the fiction, the 
common law courts referred to this right of restitution as one derived from 
implied-in-law quasi-contracts, which is a distinctly legal way of saying 
that no true agreement of the parties existed. The common law's remedy for 
"breach" of a quasi-contract was restitution-that is, the return of the 
benefit unjustly held by the defendant. Restitution thus became a logical 
response to a right of action based on preventing unjust enrichment. 
More specific forms of action under assumpsit were developed for 
particular fact patterns. As a group, these became known as the common 
counts and could be divided into what were known as the debt or 
indebitatus counts, or into the value counts. 12 For example, the debt counts 
included suits for money paid for the defendant's use or to the defendant. 13 
These included true contract cases as well as unjust enrichment cases. 14 
Under the value counts, plaintiffs could sue for the value of services or for 
the value of goods provided to the defendant. The quantum meruit count 
allowed recovery of the value of services provided, and quantum valebat 
allowed recovery of the value of goods transferred to the defendant. 15 As 
with the debt counts, the value counts included true contract claims and 
restitution claims not based on contract. 16 
B. The Equity Courts and Constructive Trusts 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the common law courts had 
gradually become less flexible in accepting new forms of action for 
emerging problems. The common law system also experienced problems in 
particular cases because of its use of uneducated laymen on juries. 17 As the 
common law courts began to provide less adequate relief, these limitations 
fueled the rise of a separate court system known as the Court of Chancery, 
which operated under the chief law member of the Kings' council, the 
chancellor. 18 Once developed, this system became known as the courts of 
equity. 
One of the more significant substantive accomplishments of the equity 
courts was their development of the law of trusts. Although trust law began 
as a method of holding and transferring land, it developed into a body of 
substantive and remedial laws designed to aid in the management of 
12. See id. at 579- 83. 
13. See id. at 581- 82. 
14. !d. at 582. 
15. !d. at 583. 
16. See id. at 583- 84. 
17. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer et al., Equitable Remedies, Restitution and Damages 
2 (8thed. 2011). 
18. !d. at 3. 
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personal property as wel1. 19 In creating the law of express trusts, the courts 
of equity used their principle of good conscience to require a trustee to do 
what, in good conscience, he should.Z0 Trust law thus created a presumption 
that protected the beneficiary by placing a burden of good faith on the 
trustee. Although the trustee held legal title to trust assets and an ever-
expanding power over these assets, he was bound by the law as a fiduciary 
to perform with loyalty and prudence.21 
The courts of equity were as adept as the common law courts at 
expanding their judicial power. They did so in a similar fashion as well; 
they used legal fictions to create superficial similarities between new rights 
and more established rights. For example, the equity courts created their 
constructive trust remedy to capture property purchased with trust funds by 
a trustee.22 Later, they extended this injunctive remedy to bind parties who 
had never agreed to a trust arrangement. 23 As the common law courts had 
reached beyond contracts to prevent unjust enrichment, the equity courts 
used the constructive trust to accomplish the same purpose.Z4 They thus 
captured property that was unjustly held by a defendant in 'the same way 
they could retrieve property wrongly taken by a trustee. In this fictional 
trust, the plaintiff was the beneficiary, and the unjustly enriched defendant 
became the implied-in-law trustee. 
Ill. OVERVIEW OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
A. Cause of Action to Prevent Unjust Enrichment 
1. Is "Unjust Enrichment" Too Vague? 
One best understands restitution by viewing it as inextricably bound up 
with a general right to prevent unjust enrichment. "Restitution is the law of 
19. See I Dobbs, supra note 7, § 2.3(2), at 75 . 
20. See id. at 77. 
21. See John H. Langbein et al., History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-
American Legal Institutions 310 (2009). 
22. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.008(a)(9) (West 2007) (stating that as one remedy 
for a breach of trust, a court can "impose a lien or a constructive trust on trust property, or trace 
trust property of which the trustee wrongfully disposed and recover the property or the proceeds 
from the property"). 
23. See Hatton v. Turner, 622 S.W.2d 450, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.- Tyler 1981 , no writ) ("A 
constructive trust is not in reality a trust but is an equitable remedy against unjust 
enrichment. ... It is not necessary to the establishment of a constructive trust that an express or 
conventional trust relationship shall exist between the parties, or that any promise shall have been 
made by the one for the benefit of the other."). 
24. See 1 Dobbs, supra note 7, § 4.3(2), at 590. 
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nonconsensual [transfers of property] and nonbargained benefits .... "25 It 
protects property rights against those who have by accident or through 
wrongdoing gained control over the money, property, or benefit in 
controversy and have thus been unjustly enriched. 
Although this Article argues for the adoption of the more 
understandable modern terminology of unjust enrichment, some might 
contend that uncertainty inheres in any effort to distinguish those 
enrichments that are unjust from those that are not. In this respect, the 
Restatement (Third) concedes that "unjustified" enrichment more 
accurately describes restitution's actual focus. 26 "Unjustified enrichment is 
enrichment that lacks an adequate legal basis; it results from a transaction 
that the law treats as ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in 
ownership rights."27 The Restatement (Third) retained unjust enrichment 
because that usage has been "imposed by the first Restatement of 
Restitution."28 Nevertheless, a finding of unjust enrichment requires 
examination of the justifications for that enrichment, and that effort is no 
more unpredictable than a fmding of negligence in a tort case. One 
concludes that no justification exists for a particular enrichment through the 
application of clarifying rules that arise from limiting principles and 
specific defenses. 29 
As an example of this rule-based predictability, consider the limiting 
principle that withdraws restitution from one who acts as volunteer. 
Consider this to be Hypothetical 1. Suppose your client returned from a 
vacation to discover that a house painter (the plaintiff) has painted her 
house without permission and has billed her $5,000-the actual value added 
to her house. If she refuses to pay, the plaintiff might sue your client for the 
$5,000 benefit she currently enjoys at the plaintiffs expense, claiming that 
your client has been unjustly enriched. 
Even if the client has been enriched, the critical question is whether 
retaining that (nonreturnable) benefit without compensating the plaintiff 
would be unjust. Answering this question involves an identification of the 
justifications for allowing her to keep the benefit without paying. First, your 
client did not ask for the benefit and was not given the opportunity to reject 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ I cmt. d (2011 ). 
26. See id. § I cmt. b. In Comment b, the Restatement (Third) recognizes the greater 
explanatory power of the phrase unjustified enrichment. This adjective more helpfully describes 
the focus of liability for restitution by making clear the concern with an enrichment that lacks a 
legal, rather than a moral, justification. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. 
29. See generally id. § § 62-67 (describing standard defenses to a claim in restitution and 
related rules governing value and notice). 
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it. Because the benefit is nonreturnable-in that she cannot peel the paint 
off her house-she would be forced to incur a cost she might have deferred 
if given the chance. Second, the plaintiff intentionally sought to place this 
expense on your client by denying her right to engage in contractual 
negotiation or to reject this arrangement. Finally, the plaintiff in this case 
engaged in a wrongful action, trespass, in order to impose this benefit on 
your client. The law of restitution speaks of this situation through a 
shorthand label by denying a remedy to a "volunteer" or an "officious 
intermeddler," but the analysis relies on specific rule-based justifications to 
support or deny restitution.30 
Under the law of restitution, Hypothetical 1 would be an easy case. A 
harder case would arise if the plaintiff could prove the improvement was 
made because of a mistake.31 For example, assume the plaintiff painted the 
wrong house believing it belonged to someone who had requested that 
work. In this instance, the law recognizes an equitable justification on his 
part, but his conferral of a nonreturnable benefit means his requested 
remedy nevertheless results in an involuntary exchange, forcing the 
defendant to pay for a benefit she did not request. 32 In this harder case, a 
court must decide who will prevail in a conflict between two innocent 
parties, each having some justification for their position. That decision will 
require some use of the court's equitable power and some resort to its sense 
of justice. Nevertheless, legal rules and precedents will inform the court in 
narrowing the issue and in making that hard decision, much as they do in 
other areas of the law. 
2. What Elements Describe the Cause? 
Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) states that " [a] person who is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in 
restitution."33 Although the Restatement (Third) does not describe these 
specifics as elements of a cause of action, section 1 does describe the 
factual characteristics and legal conclusions that establish a prima facie 
30. See id. § 2(3) ("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily 
conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant's intervention in the 
absence of contract."). If the claimant has neglected to discuss or has intentionally avoided a 
contractual arrangement, restitution will not be available because contracting for these obligations 
is preferred over restitution. See id. § 2 cmt. b. As discussed below, the existence of a valid and 
enforceable contract prevents the claim that one party has been unjustly enriched by virtue of the 
contract's operation. The Restatement (Third) recites the following limiting principle: "A valid 
contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that 
extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment." /d. § 2(2). 
31. See id. § 10. 
32. See id. § I 0 cmt. a. 
33 . /d. § 1. 
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claim for restitution. The defendant's liability thus depends on the 
acquisition of a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff and, finally, on the 
court's conclusion that retention of this benefit constitutes unjust 
enrichment. 34 
These three elements describe the core requirements that any plaintiff 
must fulfill before the remedies of restitution become available.35 Some 
courts insist on referring to unjust enrichment as a mere theory justifying 
restitution, but calling the concept a theory obscures its practical 
importance. Proving the civil liability that authorizes a court to award 
restitution requires more than a moral or theoretical decision about whether 
some person deserves a particular enrichment. One proceeds as with any 
other legal conflict to determine unjust enrichment by considering facts and 
narrowing issues in light of rules and precedents. Unjust enrichment thereby 
stands not for an abstract theory but for a conclusion of liability reached 
after the application of legal rules. 
In applying the first two elements of the unjust enrichment cause of 
action, one investigates the relationship of the parties, and this effort may 
well end the claim. The plaintiff has standing to sue only to recover that 
benefit to which he has an arguable right. The plaintiff must have lost 
something, and therefore no disinterested person can challenge the 
enrichment of another. Furthermore, the defendant must have obtained a 
benefit at the expense of the plaintiff in a manner that was not foreordained 
by contract. As noted throughout this Article, a valid and enforceable 
contract bars a suit for unjust enrichment. 
Consider the following example as Hypothetical 2. Assume two 
parties, one being the active operator and the other an investor, jointly 
participate in the purchase of an oil and gas lease in accordance with a 
34. The Colorado Supreme Court in its decision in Lewis v. Lewis explained its unjust 
enrichment claim in the following manner: "We have previously determined that a party claiming 
unjust enrichment must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff's 
expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without commensurate compensation." Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (en 
bane). If one worries that this is a vague and open-ended claim, compare it with the universally 
accepted claim for negligence. Courts describe a negligence claim as one requiring a showing that 
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) thereby 
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. See MICHOL O'CONNOR, O'Connor's Texas Causes of 
Action 657 (2012). 
35. The Restatement (Third) voices some hesitation about the use of checklists to determine 
liability for restitution. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
§ I cmt. d (20 11 ). The danger, however, arises from the inclusion of particularized factors such as 
one requiring the defendant to have "appreciated" the benefit received. See id. The elements listed 
by the Colorado Supreme Court in Lewis serve the important function of alerting litigants and 
lower courts to that which must be pleaded and proved. Furthermore, these elements are free of 
unnecessary and mischievous limiting factors and closely track what the Restatement (Third) 
posits as the fundamental principles of liability. 
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contractual agreement. Assume the active operator acquires a second oil 
and gas lease without including the investor. 36 If their agreement says 
nothing about other ventures, the first purchase does not prove that the 
active party owes the investing party a portion of the profits obtained from 
another lease. Although the investor may feel betrayed by not being 
included on the second lease, that party has no arguable right under these 
facts to the benefit being sought. 37 Even if the active party acquires a 
benefit from the second lease, that benefit was not obtained at the expense 
of the investing party. In this fashion, the first two elements, though 
seemingly factual, can answer the question posed by the third element to 
prove no unjust enrichment occurred. 
3. Should the Cause of Action Be Independent? 
The independence of the cause of action for unjust enrichment 
becomes especially important when the defendant has obtained a benefit 
because of the plaintiffs rnistake. 38 Under these circumstances, the plaintiff 
may have no tort or contract claim. For example, suppose your client 
attempted an online transfer of $200,000 to her local bank account but 
misstated her account number. Consider these facts as Hypothetical 3. This 
transmission error caused the deposit of her money in the account of an 
unrelated party, who then moved the money into certificates of deposit, 
thereby placing the money beyond the immediate power of the bank. 
Removing money from one's own bank account does not appear to be a 
wrongful act or in violation of any agreement an account holder generally 
has with his bank. This recipient did, however, obtain a benefit at the 
expense of your client, and no legal justification exists that is sufficient to 
allow retention of that benefit. 39 
Even if one argued that in Hypothetical3 a tort claim did support your 
client's suit for her $200,000, the remedy in tort would typically consist of a 
36. These facts are taken from Rankin v. Naftalis . See Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 
942-43 (Tex. 1977). 
37. See id. at 946. The second lease was outside the operating agreement and therefore 
outside any fiduciary relationship. !d. 
38. See, e.g., Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank in Abilene, 628 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1982) 
("Generally, a party who pays funds under a mistake of fact may recover restitution of those funds 
if the party to whom payment was made has not materially changed his position in reliance 
thereon. The purpose of such restitution is to prevent unconscionable loss to the party paying out 
the funds and unjust enrichment to the party receiving the payment." (citations omitted)). 
39. See Castano v. Wells Fargo Bank, 82 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2002, no 
pet.). The facts of Hypothetical 3 come from the Castano case. !d. at 41. In Castano, the plaintiff 
sued the bank, which then impleaded the recipient of the funds. !d. at 42 . The court of appeals 
affmned the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust, which forced the recipient to return the 
certificates of deposit to the plaintiff. !d. at 43. 
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monetary judgment for the principal plus interest. In contrast, the unjust 
enrichment cause of action supports restitution or return of the benefit 
acquired by the defendant. In this case, the plaintiff would seek a 
constructive trust, which amounts to an injunction ordering the defendant to 
return the certificates of deposit that he unjustly holds. Which claim and 
remedy favors the plaintiff: the CDs handed over under threat of contempt 
or a money judgment against someone who might during the enforcement 
process spend your client's money on a vacation tour of Europe? 
Another valuable aspect of restitution has to do with what is called the 
right to force disgorgement of profits. Assume, as Hypothetical 4, a 
geologist employee of an oil company uses confidential company 
information to aid his collaborators in buying oil and gas leases. These ill-
gotten gains, the leases, now have a value approaching one million dollars, 
but the geological data that was purloined had a relatively negligible value. 
A tort claim for this theft would seem limited to the value of the data 
converted at the time of conversion, but restitution from a conscious 
wrongdoer who converts a plaintiffs property includes disgorgement of any 
profits made through the use of the purloined property.40 In this fashion, 
restitution can offer a recovery far greater than the plaintiffs loss. 
Unjust enrichment does not provide an independent claim when a valid 
and enforceable contract covers the subject matter of the dispute. This 
limitation applies because the law of contract assumes that one party may 
often benefit at the other party's expense, and contract law would be 
undermined if the losing party could ignore a binding agreement in order to 
seek the other party's gains. However, contractual claims do not always 
succeed, and some contracts may be susceptible to rescission because of 
mutual mistake or fraud. Where appropriate, therefore, a plaintiff should 
consider an unjust enrichment claim as an alternative in case the contract 
proves unenforceable. 
The existence of a generally applicable cause of action for unjust 
enrichment would avoid the need for special unjust enrichment claims, such 
as quantum meruit or money had and received. As recognized in Texas, the 
elements of the special unjust enrichment claim for money had and received 
differ little from the three elements of an unjust enrichment claim except 
that such a claim does not support the equitable remedies of restitution. 
Furthermore, the use of the arcane common-count terminology adds another 
40. See, e.g., Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1952) ("When property 
has thus been wrongfully acquired, equity converts the holder into a trustee, and compels him to 
account for all gains from such conduct."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT§ 3 (2011) ("A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong."). 
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layer of mystery to this sort of litigation, as do the Latinate title and ancient 
origins of the claim of quantum meruit. 
4. Policy Reasons Supporting the General Claim 
One can easily conjure reasons for having a clearly established legal 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment.41 First, it prevents unjustified 
deprivations of money, property, or other benefits. Second, this cause of 
action supplements existing rights by providing a remedy where neither tort 
nor contract would. Finally, at a high level of generality, liability for unjust 
enrichment depends on a simple premise of fairness that applies additional 
protection for one's property. To some, applying that premise in law 
appears dangerous because of its generality, but that generality provides 
flexibility and, in practice, is constrained by limiting rules and defenses. 
B. Restitution 
The law of restitution encompasses both a cause of action and a set of 
remedies. However, the definition of the term fits more comfortably as a 
reference to a distinct set of court-made remedies. These remedies prevent 
unjust enrichment, value profits acquired through use of wrongfully taken 
funds, and secure either property or a lien on property. The following is a 
list of the means that may be used to achieve restitution: 
• Monetary award; 
• Equitable accounting; 
• Constructive trust-traced property; 
• Equitable lien-traced property; 
• Equitable subrogation-traced to lien removal; 
• Reformation of documents; and 
• Rescission of contracts. 
The basic monetary award for restitution returns to the plaintiff the 
amount of the defendant's gain in a judgment. To calculate this basic award, 
one determines the value of the defendant's unjust enrichment at the 
plaintiffs expense.42 In many instances, the defendant's enrichment will 
equal the plaintiffs loss. However, a conscious wrongdoer who has 
enhanced the value of the property taken at the plaintiffs expense or 
41. See James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Fhird) of the 
Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 55, 57 (2007) ("The central 
substantive notion is that one must not (unjustifiably) harm another. The correlative remedial 
principle might be expressed as 'a party who unjustifiably harms another owes a duty to pay a sum 
of money that will compensate the other for the harm."'). 
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNruST ENRICHMENT § 49(1) 
(2011). 
2012] CIVIL LIABILITY FOR UNJUST E NRICHMENT 237 
profited from its use must disgorge those profits to the plaintiff. 43 As noted 
in the discussion of Hypothetical 4, this disgorgement of profits occurs 
because the law seeks to prevent a wrongdoer from benefitting, even 
marginally, from his wrong.44 Even so, disgorgement does not place the 
wrongdoer in a worse position than had he not wrongfully taken the 
plaintiffs property and, for that reason, should not be considered a punitive 
damages award subject to the Texas statutory procedures and lirnitations.45 
If a plaintiff can trace the benefit taken to identifiable property held by 
the defendant, a court can impress a constructive trust on that property. The 
court thus declares plaintiffs superior title to that property and orders the 
transfer of title by the defendant to the plaintiff.46 Again, the plaintiff can 
recover any increase in the property's value when the defendant wrongfully 
acted to acquire that property. For example, as Hypothetical 5, assume the 
defendant had embezzled $100,000 from the plaintiff and can be shown to 
have invested that money to create an Apple stock account. If the value of 
the stock has doubled by the time of suit, the plaintiff will ask the court to 
award a constructive trust on the entire account, now worth $200,000. If the 
plaintiffs money was instead used to purchase only 60% of the Apple stock 
in the account, the court can create an equitable lien in favor of the plaintiff 
on 60% of the account or $120,000.47 Both the constructive trust and the 
equitable lien give the plaintiff priority over the defendant' s other 
creditors. 48 
Professor Dobbs presents the case of a defendant who embezzles 
$100,000 and uses this money to pay off the bank note on his home and 
thereby gains release of the bank's lien.49 Unlike a claim for either a 
constructive trust or an equitable lien, the plaintiffs money was not 
exchanged for title to property now held by the defendant. Instead, the 
money removed a debt on defendant's property. In this hypothetical, 
however, the court can apply equitable subrogation both to award the 
plaintiff a judgment for the $100,000 and to secure the debt with a lien on 
43 . See id. § 49(4). 
44. See id. §§ 3, 51(4). 
45 . Disgorgement of profits causes the defendant no net loss and therefore does not amount 
to an award of punitive damages. See id. § 51 cmt. k. In International Bankers Life Insurance Co. 
v. Holloway, the Texas Supreme Court held that forcing disgorgement of profits through equity 
did not limit the plaintiff from also seeking punitive damages. 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963). 
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNruST ENRICHMENT§ 55 cmt. b 
(2011). 
47. See id. § 56. 
48. But see id. § 61 (stating that a plaintiff's right to traceable profits at the expense of an 
insolvent defendant is subordinated to the claims of innocent dependents and creditors). 
49. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 4.3(4), at 604--06. 
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the defendant's home. 5° By imposing the lien, the court awards the plaintiff 
the bank's rights as they existed before it released its lien. 
The Texas Supreme Court has also recognized the equitable nature of 
the remedy of rescission. 51 Rescission allows a court to set aside a contract 
because of mutual mistake or wrongdoing, and restitution comes into play 
because it would be unjust to allow one party to retain any benefit gained 
before rescission.52 In addition to rescission, a court can reform a document 
that was mistakenly drafted. For example, the Texas Supreme Court 
ordered rescission of a deed that erroneously conveyed only one property 
even though the grantors intended to convey two properties to the purchaser 
at foreclosure. 53 The Court refused to allow the parties to use a correction 
deed for these purposes, but held that rescission and reformation were 
appropriate to avoid the unjust enrichment of the debtor. 54 Reformation 
allows the contract to stand, but corrects any mistake. In an earlier case, the 
Supreme Court reformed a document that erroneously stated that a debtor 
had fully paid the note held by his bank. 55 If enforced, such mistakes can 
unjustifiably enrich a party to the agreement or a third party, and 
reformation operates to prevent that unjust enrichment. 
IV. LOWER TEXAS COURTS: NO INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
Most of the Texas courts of appeals and federal courts that have 
considered the question under Texas law have rejected the existence of an 
independent cause of action for unjust enrichment. It is difficult to 
understand what independence means in this context. Some courts refer to 
unjust enrichment as merely a theory of recovery rather than as the basis for 
recovery or as a description of the result when restitution is denied. Others 
suggest that the field consists solely of special claims, such as the money-
had-and-received and quantum meruit causes of action. 
Black's Law Dictionary indicates that independent can mean either 
that something is " [n]ot associated with another (often larger) entity" or that 
it is " [n]ot dependent or contingent on something else."56 When lower 
Texas courts deny that unjust enrichment is an independent cause of action, 
they may therefore mean that unjust enrichment must be viewed in light of 
its association with contract law. However, unjust enrichment claims have 
50. See id. at 606. 
51. See Smith v. Nat'! Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. 1979). 
52. See id.; I DOBBS, supra note 7, § 4.3(6), at 614-15. 
53. See Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat'! Ass'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 752- 53 (Tex. 
2009). 
54. See id. at 750-5 1, 753. 
55. See First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 876-77 (Tex. 1916). 
56. Black's Law Dictionary 774 (7th ed. 1999). 
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only a historical and fictional association with contract claims; the two do 
not share common elements beyond that history. The denial of 
independence might mean that unjust enrichment claims or the remedies of 
restitution depend on the proof of either a claim in tort or contract. This 
argument means that the unjust enrichment cause of action merely adds an 
element or theory to tort or contract claims as needed to trigger restitution. 
None of these explanations can be supported by the decisions of the Texas 
Supreme Court. 
A. Unjust Enrichment as a Theory of Recovery 
In 2002, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals decided the case of 
Mowbray v. Avery57 and included in its opinion an often-cited discussion of 
unjust enrichment. 58 The Corpus Christi court considered whether it was 
controlled by language from Texas Supreme Court decisions suggesting 
that unjust enrichment was a cause of action but decided that it was not. 59 
Instead, the Corpus Christi court emphasized that the Texas Supreme Court 
had referred to unjust enrichment as a remedy as well as a basis for 
liability.60 Because of these different uses, the court of appeals refused to 
accept "these statements as recognition of unjust enrichment as an 
independent cause of action, but [saw them] simply as a reiteration of the 
well[-]established principle that a suit for restitution may be raised against a 
party based on the theory of unjust enrichment."61 The Corpus Christi court 
thus concluded that "unjust enrichment [was] not a distinct independent 
cause of action," and characterized it instead as "a theory ofrecovery."62 
The court of appeals failed to explain how one would plead and prove 
such a "suit for restitution" or why any theory that allowed recovery was 
not a cause of action. In this regard, one federal court has noted, "Texas 
courts may waffle about whether unjust enrichment is a theory of recovery 
or an independent cause of action, but either way, they have provided the 
plaintiff with relief when the defendant has been unjustly enriched."63 The 
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals ' ruling seems to support this observation 
57. Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied). 
58. Recent decisions by Texas courts of appeals have repeated the statement that unjust 
enrichment is not an independent cause of action and have used Mowbray as authority. See, e.g., 
Casstevens v. Smith, 269 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2008, pet. denied); R.M. 
Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied); 
Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 246 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). 
59. See Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 680. 
60. !d. at 680 n.25. 
61. !d. 
62. See id. at 679. 
63. Newington Ltd. v. Forrester, No. 3:08-CV-0864-G ECF, 2008 WL 4908200 at *4 (N.D. 
Tex. Nov. 13, 2008). 
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by concluding that recovery can be supported under an unjust enrichment 
theory when the defendant "has obtained a benefit from another due to 
fraud, duress or taking of undue advantage. "64 
This language appears to accept restitution for reasons that do not 
differ significantly from unjust enrichment. The court of appeals approved 
restitution of a benefit that "would be unconscionable for the receiving 
party to retain"65 when circumstances created an "implied or quasi-
contractual obligation to repay."66 Without demanding proof of tortious acts 
by the defendant, the court of appeals also recognized that "[t]he unjust 
enrichment doctrine applies the principles of restitution to disputes where 
there is no actual contract."67 In this manner, the court of appeals seemed to 
recognize that a legal basis for restitution exists outside tort or contract-
that is, "independent" ofthose two bodies of law. 
1. Not a Contract or a Tort 
In following Mowbray, other Texas courts have accepted its language 
and have seemingly accepted restitution as a remedy for a quasi-contract 
cause of action that is neither tort nor contract. In Walker v. Cotter 
Properties, lnc.,68 the Dallas Court of Appeals made the following 
statement: "Unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action but 
rather characterizes the result of a failure to make restitution of benefits 
either wrongfully or passively received under circumstances which give rise 
to an implied or quasi-contractual obligation to repay."69 The court thereby 
characterized restitution as a remedy to prevent unjust enrichment and 
stated that the remedy applies whether the defendant acted wrongfully or 
not. Because one who passively receives a benefit ordinarily does not 
thereby commit a tort, the Dallas Court of Appeals necessarily recognized 
that the liability it was discussing may not rest in the law of tort. The 
reference to an "implied or quasi-contractual obligation to pay" effectively 
separates the obligation from one based on an agreement of the parties. 
Instead, such an obligation to pay arises as a matter of law to avoid what 
would otherwise be an unjust enrichment. 70 
64. Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 679 (citing Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 
S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)). 
65 . !d. at 679. 
66. !d. 
67. !d. 
68. Walker v. Cotter Props., Inc. , 181 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. App.- Dallas 2006, no pet.). 
69. !d. at 900. 
70. See id. 
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Numerous Texas courts have quoted this language from Walker in 
rejecting an independent claim for unjust enrichment.71 As suggested above, 
one argument for this conclusion would be that unjust enrichment claims 
are always dependent on other causes of action. This explanation fails for at 
least three reasons. First, since a valid contract preempts such claims, unjust 
enrichment could only be dependent on tort claims.72 If the contract is 
faulty, an unjust enrichment claim can apply, but its basis would be unjust 
enrichment and not contract law. Second, contending that unjust enrichment 
depends on the existence of a valid tort claim fails to account for the 
plaintiffs historical right to "waive the tort" and assert unjust enrichment 
instead. 73 Third, the view that restitution is merely an alternative remedy in 
tort or contract has been directly contradicted by Texas Supreme Court 
rulings justifying restitution when unjust enrichment was the result of the 
claimant's mistake. 74 
Restitution allows a claimant to recover because of her own mistake. 
Tort claims, on the other hand, allow recovery when the defendant's 
mistake causes the plaintiff harm and amounts to negligence, defective 
design, or failure to warn. Restitution restores a benefit to a plaintiff even 
though an innocent defendant passively received that benefit as a result of 
the plaintiffs own mistake. This distinction was noted in the discussion of 
Hypothetical 3, where the plaintiff through a wire transfer erroneously 
directed her money into the defendant's bank account. 75 
2. Quasi-Contract 
Even the Dallas Court of Appeals in Walker recognized a general 
cause of action, but labeled it as one arising from "an implied or quasi-
71. See Casstevens v. Smith, 269 S.W.3d 222, 229 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 2008, pet. 
denied); R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson, 258 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. 
denied); Argyle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 246 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2007, no 
pet.); Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, 197 S.W.3d 826, 832 (Tex. App.-Fort 
Worth 2006), rev 'd on other grounds, 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007). The federal courts in the Fifth 
Circuit, when applying Texas law, have concluded that unjust enrichment is not an independent 
cause of action but is instead the theory supporting special unjust enrichment claims. See Hancock 
v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 539, 560 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
72. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005). 
73 . See Ferrous Prods. Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Houston [1st Dist.]1959), ajf'd, 332 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1960); see also William A. Keener, 
Waiver of Tort, 6 HARV. L. REV. 223, 232 (1893). 
74. See Myrad Props., Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat' I Ass 'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 753 (Tex. 2009); 
Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974). If the remedies of restitution 
depended on the commission of a tort, the impressing of a constructive trust in Castano v. Wells 
Fargo Bank would also have to be deemed erroneous. 82 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 
2002, no pet.) 
75 . See supra text accompanying notes 38- 39; see also Castano, 82 S.W.3d at 41. 
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contractual obligation to repay."76 As explained above, these quasi-contract 
and implied (in law) rights do not arise from contracts intentionally entered 
into by willing parties or because of the tortious acts of the defendant. 
Neither contract nor tort law authorizes such an "obligation to repay." Quite 
simply put, courts impose the obligation in order to serve the policies that 
demand restitution from those who have been unjustly enriched. 
The Dallas Court of Appeals, when it decided Walker, disclosed 
through its reasoning those factors it deemed relevant to recovery on quasi-
contract. 77 The case arose because third parties made fraudulent 
inducements to these litigants, thereby causing them to engage in worthless 
investments.78 The plaintiff, Jerry Walker, settled his claims against the 
third parties and as part of his compensation was assigned their claim 
against the Cotters. 79 As an assignee, Walker sued the Cotters based on 
"theories of quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion."80 He based 
his argument on the assertion that the Cotters profited from what was little 
more than a Ponzi scheme. After a bench trial, the trial court granted a 
directed verdict in favor of the Cotters and held that they were not unjustly 
enriched by funds paid them by the third party.81 
In upholding the take-nothing judgment entered against the plaintiff, 
the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that his cause of action was one based on 
quasi-contract "to prevent a party from obtaining a benefit from another by 
fraud, duress, unjust enrichment, or because of an undue advantage."82 In 
this respect at least, the Dallas court's reasoning in Walker tracks that of the 
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Mowbray. Both conclude that a cause of 
action exists to prevent unjust enrichment, but both label it quasi-contract. 83 
As a consequence, these two courts, and the courts that follow Walker or 
Mowbray, have accepted an independent cause of action that supports 
restitution to remedy unjust enrichment even though they seem unwilling to 
label it as such. 
Labeling the cause as one in quasi-contract adds confusion to, or at 
least sheds no light on, the subject. That label informs one about what the 
cause is not (not a contract) rather than what it is. As noted above, the 
quasi-contract label ' s original function was to act as a linguistic cloak for 
76. See Walker v. Cotter Prop. Inc. , 181 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no 
pet.). 
77. !d. 
78. !d. at 898. 
79. !d. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. at 898- 99. 
82. See id. at 900. 
83. See id. ; Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 679 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2002, pet. 
denied). 
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the expanswn of the common law courts ' jurisdiction over unjust 
enrichment. The common law courts thought, perhaps, that unjust 
enrichment involved a wrong that sufficiently resembled a breach of 
contract. Quasi means that one thing resembles, but is not actually the same 
as, something else.84 Using such terminology might have been necessary to 
shield the courts from criticism or from a hostile reaction by the kings or 
queens of England, but these fictions have long ago outlived their 
usefulness. 
The Mowbray and Walker decisions characterize unjust enrichment as 
either the theory behind, or an element of, a general claim labeled quasi-
contract. Even if this were merely a contest about the proper name for a 
claim to prevent unjust enrichment, the quasi-contract terminology would 
be the wrong choice. The historical authority these courts draw upon for a 
claim in quasi-contract firmly limits that right of action to the common law. 
That historical source therefore prevents a quasi-contract claim from 
supporting an equitable remedy. As a consequence, using the quasi-contract 
label appears to leave the equitable remedies of restitution unsupported. The 
Texas Supreme Court has clearly recognized those equitable remedies and 
has used them to prevent unjust enrichment. On the other hand, labeling the 
independent claim more in accordance with its function-as one for the 
prevention of unjust enrichment- would more clearly identify a claim that 
could also support both the common law and the equitable remedies of 
restitution. 
B. Special Unjust Enrichment Claims 
Another reason for denying independence to an unjust enrichment 
cause of action comes from the conclusion that the field really has been 
occupied by special unjust enrichment claims. However, that argument 
falters once one recognizes, as above, the historical background that 
provides the basis for these claims in the first place. The money-had-and-
received and quantum meruit claims recognized in Texas arose originally as 
common counts in the common law' s special assumpsit form of action. 
That historical background appears to restrict these claims so that, as with a 
quasi-contract claim, they would not support the numerous equitable 
restitution remedies that have been recognized and applied by the Texas 
Supreme Court. 
84. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (7th ed. 1999). 
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1. Money Had and Received 
Over fifty years ago, the Texas Supreme Court described the cause of 
action for money had and received as one that depends on findings that (1) 
money held by the defendant (2) belongs to the plaintiff (3) as a matter of 
"equity, justice, and law."85 In that case, Staats v. Miller, the supreme court 
noted that the money-had-and-received cause was substantially free of 
restrictive rules and formalities because it depends on the "abstract justice 
of the case."86 Proof of the defendant's wrongdoing in acquiring the 
plaintiffs money or benefit may add equitable weight to the plaintiffs case, 
but wrongdoing is not a requirement for the remedy.87 This cause of action 
therefore allows restitution so the plaintiff can recover the money unjustly 
held by the defendant. 88 
The money-had-and-received cause is specialized in the limited sense 
that its language refers to money rather than to real or personal property, but 
Texas courts have accepted its application in cases in which tangible 
property has been taken and converted into money by the defendant.89 In 
Tri-State Chemicals, Inc. v. Western Organics, Inc. , the Amarillo Court of 
Appeals overturned a summary judgment for the defendant based on the 
trial court's fmding90 that the plaintiffs money-had-and-received claim 
failed because it sought recovery of property rather than money. The 
Amarillo Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiff had asserted two causes 
of action, one in assumpsit and a second for money had and received, and 
concluded that Texas courts looked past "names and procedural 
technicalities."91 It held that "irrespective of the name appended to the 
85. Staats v. Miller, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. 1951). The three elements announced by 
the Texas Supreme Court closely track the three elements of the modem cause of action for unjust 
enrichment. In fact, the Texas money-had-and-received cause of action, if expanded to include 
other property could function as an independent cause of action if it also supported equitable 
remedies. 
86. !d. The justice of the case may not be so abstract as the supreme court implies. See also 
H.E. Austin v. Duval, 735 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ denied) (plaintiffs 
must show that the money belonged to them when it was obtained by the defendant). 
87. See Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 236 S.W.3d 201 , 207 (Tex. 2007); Edwards v. 
Mid-Continent Office Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied). 
88. See Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. , 966 S.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Tex. 1998); 
see also Stonebridge, 236 S.W.3d at 207 (overruling the class certification of a money-had-and-
received class); Best Buy Co. v. Barrera, 248 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2007) (same). 
89. See Tri-State Chems., Inc. v. W. Organics, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 189, 194-95 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2002, pet. denied). 
90. The trial judge sent the parties a letter stating that the plaintiffs reliance on a money-
had-and-received claim was "misplaced" because the defendant held no money or its equivalent. 
See id. at 193. 
91. /d.atl94. 
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second claim, [the plaintiff] effectively seeks the recovery of its property 
wrongfully taken" and that Texas law allowed such a recovery. 92 
In Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Distributors, L.P., the Dallas 
Court of Appeals noted that many Texas courts use the money-had-and-
received label interchangeably with a right to restitution, claim in 
assumpsit, or one for unjust enrichment.93 In the case, the plaintiff alleged 
that a third party had deceived him into paying debts the third party owed 
the two defendants. 94 The plaintiff sued the recipients of his money, rather 
than the third party, presumably because they were in possession of his 
money and could pay a judgment.95 The Dallas Court of Appeals in 
Edwards concluded that the trial court had not unreasonably balanced the 
equities in the case to find against the plaintiff.96 As the court in Edwards 
noted, calling the claim one for money had and received, restitution, quasi-
contract, or unjust enrichment should have little effect on the analysis.97 
Nevertheless, in Hancock v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,98 the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas stated that the Texas 
Supreme Court has never "recognized a claim for unjust enrichment as 
independent from an action for money had and received."99 This ruling 
would, if adopted, reduce unjust enrichment to either an alternative label or 
a theoretical justification for the money-had-and-received cause of action 
under Texas law. That ruling might also logically support the conclusion 
that these special causes of action occupy the field in preventing unjust 
enrichment. 100 Assumpsit's common counts of money had and received and 
quantum meruit, as noted, originated in the common law courts and 
historically provide no support for equitable restitution. 
2. Quantum Meruit 
Under Texas law, when the claim is not based on a breach of contract, 
one pleads a cause of action in quantum meruit to recover compensation for 
goods or services provided to the defendant. That means this cause of action 
fits within the historical category of a quasi-contract. Instead of a contract, 
92. !d. at 195. 
93. Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Distribs. , L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833 , 837 n.7 (Tex. 
App.- Dallas 2008, pet. denied). 
94. See id. at 835 . 
95. !d. at 834-35. 
96. !d. at 841. 
97. See id. 
98. Hancock v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 539 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
99. !d. at 561. 
100. See id. at 560-61 ; see also Verizon Emp. Benefits Comm. v. Frawley, 655 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 648 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
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the right to recover depends on an unjust enrichment theory. 101 A valid 
contract-one supporting a breach of contract action-can be created by 
express terms or can be inferred from the words and actions of the parties. 
The latter is referred to as an "implied-in-fact contract." The implied-in-fact 
contract depends on the apparent intention of the parties "manifested in 
language or by implication from other circumstances."102 In contrast, the 
quantum meruit cause of action allows recovery only when no valid, 
express or implied-in-fact agreement exists between the parties; it is what 
has been called an "implied-in-law contract" or, as it is termed more 
generally, a quasi-contract. 103 
Proof of a valid contract prevents recovery under a quantum meruit 
claim. 104 A contract represents the agreed-upon rights and obligations of the 
parties, and the policies of unjust enrichment do not operate to allow one 
party to avoid contractual obligations. 105 Nevertheless, plaintiffs often assert 
a quantum meruit claim as an alternative to a breach of contract claim in 
order to protect against the possibility that the latter claim might fail. 
The elements of a quantum meruit cause of action are: 
1. valuable services were rendered or materials furnished [by the 
plaintiff]; 
2. for the person sought to be charged; 
3. which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to 
be charged, used and enjoyed by him; 
4. under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought 
to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was 
expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged. 106 
The first two of these elements closely track the first two elements of a 
general unjust enrichment cause of action. The defendant must have 
obtained a particular kind of benefit (services or goods) at the expense of 
the plaintiff. However, in lieu of the more general showing that retention of 
the benefit without compensation would be unjust, the quantum meruit 
101. See Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. , 246 
S.W.3d 42, 49-50 (Tex. 2008). 
102. Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 4 cmt. a (1981). 
103. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005). 
104. See Frank 's Casing, 246 S.W.3d at 50; see also Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 
(Tex. 1988). 
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRJCHMENT § 2 cmt. c 
(2011) (restitution must be subordinated to contract law when parties have defined their own 
obligations by agreement). 
106. Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). The 
Texas Supreme Court's statement of the first element merges the general assumpsit counts of 
quantum meruit (claim for services) and quantum valebat (claims for goods). 
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claim requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant knew before receiving the 
benefit that the plaintiff expected compensation. 
One might reasonably expect that a defendant who knowingly 
accepted services with knowledge of the plaintiffs expectation of 
compensation would be bound by an implied-in-fact contract. Failure to pay 
under these circumstances would leave the plaintiff with a breach of 
contract cause of action. For instance, a person who makes an offer to a 
farmer to clear a ten-acre tract of the farmer's land may fail to agree with 
the farmer on a price. However, when the farmer agrees to this service, he 
does so with knowledge that the offeror expected compensation. Such 
knowledge would seem invariably to transform a quantum meruit claim into 
an implied-in-fact contract requiring the farmer to pay a reasonable fee. 107 
However, the agreement might fail because of indefiniteness or for 
some other reason. Under those circumstances, a quantum meruit claim 
based on unjust enrichment rather than on contract would be appropriate. 
The amount of recovery would be similar to a suit for an implied-in-fact 
contract-that is, a reasonable price.108 Assume instead, as Hypothetical 6, 
the land-clearing offer was made to farmer A, who agreed to have the land 
cleared, but the land-clearing company mistakenly cleared a ten-acre tract 
owned by farmer B, thinking it was the land of farmer A. If we assume no 
other facts, the land-clearing company cannot recover from farmer A or 
farmer B based on contract, and could only seek recovery through quantum 
meruit against farmer B, the party who received the benefit of its services. 
Under those circumstances, farmer B would contend that the land-
clearing company could not recover in quantum meruit because farmer B 
failed to accept the services and, at the time they were provided, was not 
reasonably notified that the plaintiff expected compensation. Because the 
benefit was nonreturnable, farmer B has no choice but to enjoy these 
benefits. In short, the Texas requirements for quantum meruit make sense 
only when limited to the failed contract case. 
If, on the other hand, this claim were described as a general unjust 
enrichment claim, farmer B would assert the "volunteer's defense" that 
denies recovery to those who, without request, voluntarily provide services. 
That defense would not block the company's claim if it could prove that 
farmer B knew of the work as it was going on and knew of the company's 
mistake.109 The company could also counter that defense by seeking 
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. e 
(20 11). 
108. See id. § 31 cmt. e, illus. 7. 
109. Professor Kovacic-Fleischer argues that the key difference between a fmding of 
contract or reliance solely on quantum meruit lies in the existence of a request by the defendant 
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restitution as a mistaken improver, 110 but courts find it difficult to order 
compensation from a defendant who did nothing to encourage work that it 
would not have chosen to buy. 111 In other words, a general unjust 
enrichment claim would allow, or encounter defenses that prevented, 
restitution in most of the same cases. The resolution would, however, be 
reached through a more direct discussion of the essential questions rather 
than through artificially imposed nomenclature. 
Quantum meruit claims have also been applied in cases in which the 
plaintiff was a subcontractor, having a contract only with a now-insolvent 
general contractor. Difficult questions arise when the unpaid subcontractor 
sues the property owner and its quantum meruit claim depends on the 
existence of facts tending to satisfy the fourth requirement. The owner who 
has paid the prime contractor and is now sued in quantum meruit by the 
subcontractor can argue that it is not enriched, much less unjustly so, by 
receipt of the services provided by the subcontractor. 112 
The last two quantum meruit elements will thus be affected by the 
same factors that would be considered as limitations on or defenses to a 
general unjust enrichment claim. In both instances, the court will determine 
whether retention of a benefit by the defendant was unjustified. If the owner 
had not paid the general contractor and possesses the benefit added by those 
services that it requested (though from the general contractor), retention of 
that benefit seems unjustified. The owner, who expected to pay a certain 
amount for the services provided, is not unjustly treated by having to 
transfer that sum to the subcontractor. 113 The last two elements of quantum 
meruit add little to the proper resolution of this conflict, and analysis would 
be much improved by adopting a general unjust enrichment claim that is 
cabined by very similar defenses. 114 
In the Texas Supreme Court decision Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., Vortt provided seismic services and information in order to 
for the services. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Quantum Meruit and the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 27 Rev. Litig. 127, 132 (2007). 
110. "A person who improves the real or personal property of another, acting by mistake, 
has a claim in restitution as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 10 (2011). In Texas, the property code provides a 
statutory remedy for one who, in good faith, possessed the property and made improvements. See 
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.02I (2000). 
Ill. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § I 0 cmt. a 
(2011). 
Il2. See Doug Rendleman, Quantum Meruit for the Subcontractor: Has Restitution Jumped 
off Dawson's Dock?, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2055, 2073 (200 I). 
113. See id. at 2074. 
Il4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 2(3) (2011) 
("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the 
circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant's intervention in the absence of contract."). 
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Ch . . h v 11 5 encourage evron to enter a JOlllt operatrng agreement wit ortt. 
Without entering the agreement, but with knowledge of Vortt's motive, 
Chevron drilled a producing well at the location indicated by Vortt's 
information. 116 In the subsequent litigation, a trial court entered judgment 
on Vortt's quantum meruit claim, awarding it $178,750 for information that 
cost it roughly $18,000.117 In other words, the majority upheld a trial court 
award that was approximately ten times the cost of the data, effectively 
forcing Chevron to disgorge some of the profits earned from the data. Vortt 
thus gained a much greater award than it was likely to obtain in a 
contractual arrangement. Had the supreme court used a general unjust 
enrichment cause of action, it would have been more difficult to order 
disgorgement except upon proof that Chevron's actions made it a conscious 
wrongdoer. 118 
This discussion began with a consideration of the factors that 
distinguish a claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract (one inferred 
from the circumstances) from a claim for unjust enrichment (in the absence 
of a contract). Quantum meruit's third element-proving the defendant 
"accepted" the services and "used and enjoyed" them-imposes artificial 
requirements to the extent that they divert attention from the inquiry about 
whether the defendant was unjustly enriched by not having to pay for the 
services received. The fourth element explains little to aid in distinguishing 
a true contract claim and a quantum meruit claim. In most instances, a 
defendant who has timely notice that the plaintiff is performing services 
with the expectation of payment will either have requested services or be 
estopped from denying a contract. The elements of a Texas quantum meruit 
claim seem to provide recovery only when a contractual claim fails for 
some reason. Application of the general unjust enrichment cause of action 
would cause less confusion and allow better decisions. 11 9 
V. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The modern cause of action establishing civil liability for restitution 
rests on the fulfillment of three requirements: (1) The defendant must have 
115. Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990). 
Jl6. !d. 
117. !d. at 946 (Hecht, J., dissenting) . 
118. Even if Chevron had requested the services and goods provided by Vortt, recovery 
should have been limited to the lesser of a market price or that price the defendant expressed a 
wi llingness to pay. See RESTATEMENT (THlRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRJCHMENT § 31 
cmt. e (2011). 
119. See Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tex. 1992) (Texas 
Supreme Court decided against subcontractor's noncontractual claim for payment against the city 
on the basis of unjust enrichment even though a quantum meruit claim was also made). 
250 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:225 
gained a benefit (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) and retention of that 
benefit must be shown to be unjust. 120 An independent unjust enrichment 
claim of this sort would replace the artificial limitations of special unjust 
enrichment claims and exist as a freestanding cause of action independent 
of tort or contract law. Although the evidence suggests that the Texas 
Supreme Court has accepted such a claim and speaks of it as an unjust 
enrichment claim, that court has not done so with such clarity as to end 
controversy on the issue. 
The Texas Supreme Court has clearly authorized Texas courts to 
adjudicate freestanding claims-ones not dependent on tort or contract and 
ones based on the policy of preventing unjust enrichment. 121 As noted 
above, the supreme court has clearly recognized the special claims of 
money had and received and quantum meruit-neither one of these claims 
depends on proof of a right under either tort or contract. 
A. Limitations for Unjust Enrichment Claims 
The Texas Supreme Court has expressly recognized unjust enrichment 
claims by treating them separately for limitations purposes. In Friberg-
Cooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals 
reversed a trial court's application of the two-year statute of limitations to 
what the plaintiff labeled an unjust enrichment claim. 122 The court of 
appeals concluded that the plaintiff had actually asserted a money-had-and-
received cause of action because "[u]njust enrichment, itself, is not an 
independent cause of action."123 That court also noted how money had and 
received had been expanded beyond its original application to contract 
cases in the famous case of Moses v. Macferlan. 124 This expansion allowed 
the common law courts to prevent unjust enrichment by providing 
restitution in cases where contract law did not support recovery.125 
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs money-
had-and-received claim was really a claim on a debt not in writing and was 
therefore subject to the four-year statute of limitations. 126 The Texas 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that all "extra-contractual actions for 
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNWST ENRICHMENT § I cmt. a 
(2011). 
121. Although a valid contract prevents use of an unjust enrichment claim, a pleader can use 
such a claim as an alternative should the contract be deemed invalid. 
122. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp. v. Elledge, 197 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Fort 
Worth 2006), rev'd, 240 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). 
123. !d. at 832. 
124. !d. (citing Moses v. Macferlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K..B.)). 
125. See id. 
126. !d. at 833 . 
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unjust enrichment" must be brought within the two-year limitations 
period.127 The supreme court declared "categorically" that "[u]njust 
enrichment claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations." 128 
Although it mentioned "unjust enrichment claims" six times in its three-
page per curiam opinion, the supreme court did not refer to the claim at 
issue as one for money had and received. Instead, it referred to the claim as 
one seeking restitution "under an unjust enrichment theory."129 
B. Legal and Equitable Restitution 
As discussed above, both the common law and equity courts of 
England developed civil liability for one unjustly enriched. The different 
remedies available in common law or equity to accomplish restitution 
distinguished the two forms of claims. In the common law courts, the 
primary remedy was a monetary award, but the courts of equity primarily 
designed special forms of its injunctive remedy to prevent unjust 
enrichment. The equity courts used various names, such as constructive 
trusts or equitable liens, but the operative mechanism was the injunction-
the most significant remedy of equity courts. 
The following decisions of the Texas Supreme Court have been chosen 
because either the court's language or its ruling bears upon the question of 
whether a general unjust enrichment cause of action exists in Texas law. 
These decisions have been separated into the two categories: common law 
or "legal" restitution (cases featuring monetary awards) and equitable 
restitution (cases featuring one of the remedies developed in the courts of 
equity). This division adds order to the discussion and shows how the Texas 
Supreme Court has found liability for equitable restitution without regard to 
the common law claims for quasi-contract, money had and received, and 
quantum meruit. 
C. Legal Restitution 
In Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court found 
liability in a case in which the facts supported the three elements of a 
general unjust enrichment cause of action. 130 In Gavenda, royalty owners 
sued the oil and gas lease operator for underpayment of royalties. 131 The 
operator had prepared division orders that, in respect to the plaintiffs, 
127. Elledge v. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Tex. 2007) (per 
curiam). 
128. Id. at 871. 
129. Id. at 869. 
130. Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc. , 705 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. 1986). 
131. Id. at691. 
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erroneously reduced the percentage of their royalties. 132 Division orders 
prescribe the procedure for distributing royalty proceeds and designate the 
recipients and the proportion they are due from the sale of oil and gas. The 
operator defended based on the Texas rule that division orders bind 
underpaid royalty owners until revoked. 133 Prior to that revocation, the 
operator is immune to suit based on errors in the order. Both the trial court 
and the court of appeals held in favor of the operator on this ground. 134 
The rule protecting unrevoked division orders is typically justified by 
the need to protect operators and purchasers and to enhance the stability of 
the oil and gas industry. 135 However, the Texas Supreme Court noted that 
the rule applied when an operator overpaid some royalty owners and 
underpaid others, but had itself retained none of the money it should have 
paid in royalties.136 Under these circumstances, recovery from the operator 
by the underpaid royalty owners would impose double liability-the 
operator would have to pay an additional amount that duplicated what it had 
already paid the overpaid royalty owners. 137 In addition, an operator who 
erred in this fashion would not profit from the error and, therefore, could 
not have been enriched, much less unjustly so. 138 Furthermore, enforcing 
the division order did not leave the underpaid royalty owners without a 
remedy because they could sue the overpaid royalty owners. 139 The supreme 
court described its reasoning by noting that "[t]he basis for recovery is 
unjust enrichment; the overpaid royalty owner is not entitled to the 
royalties. "140 
In the Gavenda case, the operator prepared erroneous division orders 
and retained money due the underpaid royalty owners. Under these 
circumstances, the Texas Supreme Court held that division orders were not 
binding, and the underpaid royalty owners could recover the money 
retained by the operator because to the extent it profited from its own error 
"[t]here was unjust enrichment."141 As noted, the three elements for a 
general unjust enrichment cause of action consist of (1) the defendant 
having obtained a benefit (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) and 
retention of that benefit would constitute unjust enrichment. These three 
132. !d. 
133. !d. 
134. !d. at 690. 
135. See id. at 692. 
136. See id. 
137. !d. 
138. See id. 
139. !d. 
140. !d. 
141. See id. This reasoning by the supreme court applied the three elements of a general 
unjust enrichment cause of action. 
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elements explain how the royalty owners (the plaintiffs) who sued the 
operator (the defendant) proved that the operator retained their royalties, 
thereby gaining a benefit at their expense. The operator had no justification 
for retaining those benefits and was therefore unjustly enriched. When, 
instead, the operator erred in paying the proper amounts to various royalty 
owners but retained none of these royalties, it gained no benefit at the 
expense of the underpaid royalty owners and could not have been unjustly 
enriched. 
In Heldenfels Brothers v. City of Corpus Christi, 142 the Texas Supreme 
Court denied the plaintiff relief under a "theory of unjust enrichment," but 
cited the Pope decision for the proposition that "[a] party may recover 
under the unjust enrichment theory when one person has obtained a benefit 
from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage." 143 
Referring to recovery based on a "theory" rather than on a cause of action144 
makes this quote somewhat unclear, but one does not obtain a ruling 
establishing a defendant 's liability without proving a cause of action. A 
theory that purports to create liability must be a cause of action and not a 
mere abstraction. The Texas Supreme Court thus assumed in this case, 
without deciding, that an unjust enrichment cause of action exists, as did the 
court of appeals. 145 
The Texas Supreme Court also used language that directly supports the 
existence of a general unjust enrichment cause of action in HECI 
Exploration Co. v. Nee/. 146 HECI was the lessee of a tract on which the 
Neels held oil and gas royalties. Prior to this litigation, HECI had sued 
AOP, the lessee of an adjoining tract, claiming that AOP was 
overproducing their common reservoir. HECI was the sole plaintiff and 
recovered a judgment against AOP, which HECI and AOP settled. 147 Four 
years later, the Neels sued HECI to recover that portion of HECI's 
judgment that they claimed represented damages to their royalty interests. 
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of HECI, ruling against 
all of the Neels' claims, including one for unjust enrichment. 148 
142. Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992). 
143. !d. at 41 (citing Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560, 562 (Tex. 1948)). 
144. A plaintiff must plead and prove some legal basis, which we generally call a cause of 
action, before a court has authority to impose a judicial remedy at the expense of the defendant. 
Although the court here referred to those grounds as a theory, it was nevertheless discussing the 
substantive basis for a judicial remedy. See id. 
145. See City of Corpus Christi v. Heldenfels Bros., 802 S.W.2d 35,40 (Tex. App.-Corpus 
Christi 1990), aff'd, 832 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1992). 
146. HECI Exploration Co. v. Nee!, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998). 
147. !d. at 884. 
148. !d. 
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The supreme court upheld summary judgment in respect to the unjust 
enrichment cause based on its conclusion that HECI had no legal right to 
recover from AOP for any of the interests held by the Neels. 149 Therefore, 
no part of the settlement received by HECI from AOP could represent 
payment for the harm AOP's actions caused the Neels' interests. The Neels 
may well have had an unjust enrichment cause of action against AOP, but 
they failed to assert that claim within the limitations period. 
In conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Neels could not 
sue HECI for unjust enrichment because HECI could not have been 
enriched at the Neels' expense in the settlement with AOP. 150 In this 
discussion, the supreme court made the following statement: "We have 
recognized that, in some circumstances, a royalty owner has a cause of 
action against its lessee based on unjust enrichment, but only when the 
lessee profited at the royalty owner's expense." 151 On a related point, the 
supreme court in HECI cited its earlier decision in Gavenda v. Strata 
Energy, Inc.152 for the proposition that a lessee's erroneous division order 
was not binding on a royalty owner when that order had caused the lessee to 
retain funds due that royalty owner. 153 If, on the other hand, the lessee's 
error merely overpays some and underpays other royalty owners, the 
underpaid royalty owners possess an unjust enrichment claim against the 
overpaid royalty owners but not against the lessee. 154 Unlike the lessee in 
Gavenda, HECI had not retained or obtained any money that was legally 
due the Neels, and therefore, HECI could not have been unjustly enriched at 
the Neels' expense. 155 In HECI, as noted above, the supreme court 
explicitly referred to an unjust enrichment "cause of action" rather than to 
an unjust enrichment theory. 156 
In Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 157 the Texas Supreme 
Court upheld a judgment in favor of one of the plaintiffs (Cox) solely on the 
basis of an unjust enrichment cause of action. 158 In distinguishing the rights 
of the other plaintiffs, the supreme court stated that "[a] cause of action for 
149. Id. at 891-92. 
150. See id. 
151. !d. at 891. 
152. Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986). 
153 . HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 891 (citing Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692-93). 
154. See id. 
155. !d. ("The fact that HECI may have recovered more than it was entitled is a matter about 
which AOP could have complained in the suit against it, but that does not give rise to a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment in favor of the Neels." (emphasis added)). 
156. See id. ("We have recognized that, in some circumstances, a royalty owner has a cause 
of action against its lessee based on unjust enrichment, but only when the lessee profited at the 
royalty owner 's expense." (first emphasis added)). 
157. Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2000). 
158. !d. at 685. 
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unjust enrichment is not available to recover payments in addition to the 
contract price the parties agreed upon." 159 However, the court upheld the 
judgment in favor of Cox based on an unjust enrichment cause of action in 
part because he was not a party to a contract during the relevant period. 160 
In Fortune, four natural gas producers (Fortune, Tucker, Hankamer, 
and Cox) had written agreements to sell natural gas to Conoco's 
predecessor in interest, Farmland. 161 After purchasing the interests and 
receiving an assignment of these contracts, Conoco had terminated the 
existing contracts and entered new ones in 1990 with three of the four 
producers. Cox had refused to enter a contract, but continued selling natural 
gas to Conoco. In 1992, Hankamer refused to renew its contract but 
continued selling natural gas to Conoco as well. 162 These four producers 
sued Conoco alleging fraud in the inducement to sign the contracts in 1990, 
contending Conoco misrepresented its ability to sell the gas according to a 
long-term contract, and claiming unjust enrichment because Conoco had 
been selling the field liquids (condensate) it collected by compressing the 
natural gas flow without sufficient payment to the producers. 163 
To the extent the plaintiffs had valid contracts that dealt with the 
subject matter of this unjust enrichment claim, the contracts precluded their 
right to recover based on unjust enrichment. 164 However, Cox had refused 
to enter a contract with Conoco during the period in question, and the Texas 
Supreme Court expressly upheld Cox's unjust enrichment judgment. 165 The 
unjust enrichment judgment awarded to Hankamer, who had stopped 
entering into contracts after Cox, was remanded because the jury had not 
distinguished between the time Hankamer was operating under an express 
contract and the period during which Hankamer was not. 166 
The Texas Supreme Court in Fortune never described Cox's claim as 
one in quantum meruit (the arguably applicable special unjust enrichment 
claim). Instead, it sustained a judgment based on unjust enrichment that did 
not depend on Conoco' s tortious conduct. The supreme court also stated 
that the plaintiffs "elected to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment rather 
than breach of contract."167 This statement supports the conclusion that the 
159. !d. As noted above, unjust enrichment cannot stand as a cause of action to alter valid 
and enforceable provisions of a contract. 
160. See id. 
161. !d. at 673- 74. 
162. !d. at 674-75 . 
163. !d. at 675 . 
164. !d. at 685 . 
165. !d. 
166. !d. 
167. !d. at 683 . 
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court accepted a general claim for unjust enrichment as independent of 
contract claims as well. 
D. Equitable Restitution 
It is clear that Texas courts award both the common law and equitable 
remedies of restitution. That is only proper, but using what are historically 
common law sources to support remedies that were not seen in the common 
law courts seems inappropriate and confusing. Of course, the Texas 
Supreme Court could expand quasi-contract to support equitable remedies. 
Unfortunately, this would continue the use of confusing terminology and 
would distort legal history as well. 
I. Constructive Trust 
In its 1948 decision in Pope v. Garrett, the Texas Supreme Court 
upheld a judgment awarding a constructive trust against all of the heirs of 
an intestate and covering all of the assets of her estate. 168 In Pope, the 
defendants had received property through the descent and distribution 
statute from the estate of Ms. Carrie Simons. Although Ms. Simons died 
without leaving a will, she had clearly intended to execute a will giving all 
of her estate to the plaintiff, Ms. Garrett. When she sought to sign her will, 
two of her heirs caused such a disturbance that she was prevented from 
executing the will. She fell seriously ill shortly thereafter and died. Some of 
the defendants who as heirs took property from Ms. Simons' estate had not 
participated in this disturbance and were innocent of any wrongdoing. 169 
Nevertheless, all of the heirs had received property from the estate as a 
result of the wrongful action of the two heirs. Because Ms. Simons had 
clearly intended to transfer all of her estate to Ms. Garrett by will, the heirs 
were all enriched at Ms. Garrett's expense. 170 The trial court impressed a 
constructive trust on all of the assets of the estate, including those assets 
held by the heirs innocent of any wrongdoing, but the court of appeals 
reversed insofar as the constructive trust affected the property in the hands 
of the innocent heirs. 17 1 
However, all of the defendants had benefited at the expense of Ms. 
Garrett, and the Texas Supreme Court held that retention of these benefits, 
even by the innocent heirs, would amount to unjust enrichment. 172 In this 
168. Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948). 
169. !d. at 559-60. 
170. See id. 
171. !d. at 559. 
172. !d. at 562. 
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fashion, the Texas Supreme Court's decision was based on the satisfaction 
of the three basic elements of a general unjust enrichment cause of action. 
Restitution through the constructive trust effectively transferred the estate's 
assets to the plaintiff because "[t]he policy against unjust enrichment argues 
in favor of the judgment rendered herein."173 The trial court impressed the 
constructive trust because "[b ]ut for the wrongful acts [of two of the 
defendants] the innocent defendants would not have inherited interests in 
the property." 174 
The supreme court recognized that some courts denied such a plaintiff 
any relief in tort against the innocent heirs because the plaintiff had no 
existing right to the property but merely an expectancy interest. 175 Without 
deciding the existence of this tort cause of action in Texas, the supreme 
court approved the trial court's power as a court of equity to compel the 
transfer of the estate to the intended legatee. 176 The supreme court 
concluded that, though not guilty of tortious wrongdoing, the innocent 
defendants had obtained a benefit at the expense of the plaintiff and that the 
"policy against unjust enrichment" required the return of that benefit to the 
plaintiff. 177 
More recently, the Texas Supreme Court stated in Meadows v. 
Bierschwale that violation of a fiduciary relationship is not necessary to 
support imposition of a constructive trust. 178 Although the supreme court 
noted that proof of actual fraud can justify a constructive trust, it cited with 
approval the first Restatement of Restitution, which explains that a 
constructive trust arises to remedy unjust enrichment and does not require 
breach of a fiduciary relation.179 
In Meadows, Oakes used fraud to induce Bierschwale to convey an 
apartment complex in exchange for a series of notes that turned out to be 
worthless. Before Bierschwale sued him, Oakes had sold the property at a 
profit to a second buyer in exchange for promissory notes that were not 
worthless. Bierschwale recovered a judgment against Oakes and obtained a 
constructive trust on the promissory notes that Oakes received from the 
second buyer. 180 
In the case before the Texas Supreme Court, Bierschwale's real estate 
agent, Meadows, sought a share of the constructive trust imposed on those 
173. /d. 
174. See id. 
175. /d. at 561. 
176. . See id. 
177. !d. at 562. 
178. Meadows v. Bierschwa1e, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974). 
179. /d. (citing Restatement of Restitution § 160 cmt. a (1937)). 
180. /d. at 127-28. 
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promissory notes. 181 Bierschwale had agreed to pay Meadows, his agent, a 
percentage ofthe sales price, but that sale initially yielded a set of worthless 
notes. 182 Bierschwale enjoyed a constructive trust on the second set of 
promissory notes that did have value, but he wanted sole possession of the 
proceeds from those notes. 183 If able to monopolize the constructive trust, 
he would likely recover his sales price, including the portion he owed 
Meadows as a commission. Although Meadows would presumably have 
had the right to recover a judgment against Bierschwale, his recovery would 
have been subject to the uncertainty and burden of enforcement. Giving 
Bierschwale, but not Meadows, the property through a constructive trust 
would thereby have tended to unjustly benefit the former at the expense of 
the latter. 
Unjust enrichment, rather than fraud or other wrongdoing, supported 
the Texas Supreme Court's decision to give Meadows a share of the 
constructive trust. The court made this clear in stating that "[ c ]onstructive 
trusts, being remedial in character, have the very broad function of 
redressing wrong or unjust enrichment."184 The court went further to say 
that "there is no unyielding formula to which a court of equity is bound in 
decreeing a constructive trust, since the equity of the transaction will shape 
the measure of relief granted."185 
2. Subrogation 
Subrogation refers to the law's permission for a plaintiff to assert the 
rights originally belonging to a third party. Parties can agree to subrogation 
in contracts, typically those involving insurance companies, and contract 
law controls the application of this "conventional" subrogation. Equitable 
subrogation applies to prevent unjust enrichment when no contract covers 
the subject matter of the conflict. 
Equitable subrogation can have two effects: it can substitute the 
plaintiff for one who originally held the right to establish the defendant's 
liability, or it can create in the plaintiff a security interest against specific 
property of the defendant. 186 The Restatement (Third) characterizes these 
two effects of equitable subrogation as substantive and remedial. 187 
181. !d. at 131. 
182. !d. at 127- 28. 
183. See id. at 131. 
184. !d. (emphasis added). 
185. !d. 
186. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 57 cmt. a 
(2011 ) ("The word 'subrogation'-an antique synonym for ' substitution'-is commonly used to 
describe both a liability and a remedy in restitution."). 
187. See id. 
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The remedial effect of subrogation typically appears in cases in which 
the defendant obtains money that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff, but uses 
that money to pay off a secured debt on specific property. For example, 
assume the defendant embezzled the plaintiffs money and used that money 
to pay off the mortgage lien on her home and to obtain a release. If tracing 
evidence supports this description of the facts, a judicial order can reinstate 
the lien to cover the amount paid with the plaintiffs money and name the 
plaintiff as the lienholder. This remedial form of equitable subrogation 
provides the plaintiff restitution only after he satisfies the requirements of 
liability-by proving unjust enrichment-and traces the benefit taken by 
the defendant to the release of the lien. 
If the plaintiff could only prove a claim for unjust enrichment but 
could not trace his money to the removal of the lien, he could nevertheless 
obtain restitution in the form of a monetary judgment. A monetary 
judgment gives him no priority over other creditors who may be competing 
for the assets of the defendant. If the plaintiff can prove the unjust 
enrichment claim and satisfy the requirement for tracing, equitable 
subrogation allows him to enjoy the priority of a lien for the same amount 
of money and thus gives him priority over unsecured creditors. 188 
Equitable subrogation's substantive effect gives the plaintiff standing 
to assert a right of action the law originally lodged with a third party. This 
effect resembles a contractual assignment of a right of action, but allows 
substitution in the absence of a contract. The law creates this extra-
contractual substitution of the plaintiff for the third party in order to prevent 
the defendant's unjust enrichment. 
For example, in Frymire Engineering Co. v. Jamar International, Ltd., 
the Texas Supreme Court used equitable subrogation to establish the 
plaintiffs standing to assert the rights of the entity whose property was 
damaged. 189 In Frymire, the Renaissance Hotel in Dallas had employed a 
general contractor to remodel one of its meeting rooms. Frymire contracted 
with the general contractor to do part of that work. In its contract with the 
general contractor, Frymire agreed to pay for any damages that its work 
caused the hotel or the general contractor and to cover this obligation with 
liability insurance. In completing its work on the hotel's air conditioning 
system, Frymire installed a valve manufactured by Jomar. A leak in the air 
conditioning water line at the location of the valve caused extensive damage 
188. See id. This remedial form of equitable subrogation is "closely analogous to the 
operation of constructive trust(§ 55) or equitable lien(§ 56), but .. . [i]nstead of an acquisition of 
property . . . at the claimant's expense, ... the claimant's assets have been used to satisfy an 
obligation of the defendant." /d. 
189. Frymire Eng'g Co. v. Jomar Int'l, Ltd., 259 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. 2008). 
260 SOUTH TEXAS LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 54:225 
to the hotel. 190 Upon demand by the hotel, Frymire ' s insurer, Liberty 
Mutual, paid the hotel $458,496 on Frymire 's behalf. In exchange for this 
payment, the hotel released Frymire and Liberty Mutual from all claims 
arising from this damage. 191 
Frymire and Liberty Mutual then sued Jomar alleging its valve was 
defective. However, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Jomar, and the court of appeals affirmed this judgment based on its 
conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert what the court 
deemed were rights belonging to the hote1. 192 The court of appeals held that 
Frymire failed to satisfy the requirements of equitable subrogation and thus 
could not obtain standing by substituting for the hote1. 193 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that 
equitable subrogation applied to give Frymire standing to assert the hotel's 
claims against Jomar. 194 In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court 
stated that Frymire should have a trial because the evidence supported its 
"contentions that it (1 ) paid a debt primarily owed by Jomar, (2) did so 
involuntarily, and (3) seeks subrogation in a situation where Jomar would 
be unjustly enriched if Frymire were precluded from pursuing its claims." 195 
Here, the immediate remedy sought was equitable subrogation, and the 
supreme court granted that remedy to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
Jomar at the expense of Frymire. The supreme court gave Frymire standing 
because it had paid off a claim that was primarily the obligation of Jomar. 196 
If Jomar had been allowed to avoid Frymire's claim for money paid to the 
hotel (allegedly to cover damages caused by Jomar' s defective product), 
Jomar would have been unjustly enriched. These characteristics track the 
three elements of a general unjust enrichment claim with the addition of a 
requirement that Frymire must not have voluntarily made the payment. 
The Texas Supreme Court stated in its earlier decision in Smart v. 
Tower Land & Investment Co. , that: 
Equitable subrogation may be invoked . .. when one person confers 
upon another a benefit that is not required by legal duty or contract 
[such as when one person pays the debt of 
another]. .. . Subrogation . .. is available, however, only when the 
190. !d. at 142. 
191. !d. 
192. !d. 
193 . /d. 
194. !d. at 147. 
195. !d. 
196. !d. 
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debtor was enriched unjustly; thus, the payor who confers a benefit as 
a "mere volunteer" is not entitled to this remedy. 197 
261 
In general, restitution will not lie "for an unrequested benefit voluntarily 
conferred." 198 The subrogation requirement that the plaintiff acted 
involuntarily merely expresses a fundamental limiting principle on unjust 
enrichment claims. 199 Frymire's contract with the general contractor 
obligated it to pay any damages its work caused the hotel, and though entry 
into this contract may have been voluntary, Frymire's "duty to honor that 
contract was not."20° Furthermore, given "the evidentiary presumption that 
Jomar's faulty product primarily caused the water damage, [the court had] 
no trouble concluding that Jomar would be unjustly enriched were Frymire 
not permitted to pursue its claims."201 
3. Rescission and Reformation 
The Texas Supreme Court has also recognized the equitable nature of 
the remedy of rescission. 202 Rescission allows a court to set aside a contract 
because of mutual mistake or wrongdoing, and restitution comes into play 
when it would be unjust to allow one party to retain any benefit gained 
before rescission.203 In addition to rescission, courts can reform a document 
that was mistakenly drafted. For example, in a 1916 decision, the Texas 
Supreme Court reformed a document that erroneously stated that a debtor 
had fully paid the note held by his bank?04 If enforced, such mistakes can 
unjustifiably enrich a party to the agreement or a third party, and 
reformation operates to prevent that unjust enrichment. 
In Myrad Properties, Inc. v. LaSalle Bank National Ass 'n, Myrad had 
obtained fmancing from LaSalle's predecessor in interest for two separate 
properties in the total amount of $1.05 million.205 An apartment complex 
was located on each of the two properties, and the deed of trust covered 
both tracts with improvements. Myrad defaulted on the loan, and LaSalle 
197. Smart v. Tower Land & Inv. Co., 597 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. 1980) . 
. 198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 2(3) (2011); see 
also id. § 2 cmt. d ("Instead of proposing a bargain, the restitution claimant first confers a benefit, 
then seeks payment for its value."). 
199. See id. § 2(3) ("There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily 
conferred, unless the circumstances of the transaction justifY the claimant's intervention in the 
absence of contract."). 
200. Frymire, 259 S.W.3d at 146. 
201. !d. 
202. See Smith v. Nat'! Resort Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. 1979). 
203. See id.; 1 DOBBS, supra note 7, § 4.3(6), at 614--15 . 
204. See First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 876-77 (Tex. 1916). 
205 . Myrad Props. , Inc. v. LaSalle Bank Nat' I Ass 'n, 300 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. 2009). 
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proceeded with foreclosure. Through oversight, the notice of foreclosure 
referred to an Exhibit A, which described only one of the properties.206 
At the foreclosure sale, the trustees referred generally to the properties 
described in the deed of trust, and LaSalle made the sole bid at auction of 
$978,000.00 for the two properties.207 However, the trustees' deed 
conveyed to LaSalle only that property described in the Exhibit A that was 
attached to the notice of foreclosure. 208 After the parties discovered this 
mistake, the trustees substituted a corrected deed transferring both 
properties for the erroneous deed that transferred only one. Myrad sued to 
restrain LaSalle from filing the corrected deed, but the district court 
ultimately allowed the correction. The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment holding that the corrected deed validly gave LaSalle title to both 
properties. 209 
The Texas Supreme Court held, however, that the correction deed was 
void as a matter of law because this device could be used only for 
correcting some facial imperfection in the title.210 In this case, the correction 
deed included an additional, separate parcel of land.211 Nevertheless, the 
supreme court held that "[r]escission is an available equitable remedy if 
mutual mistake is shown."212 It also noted that Myrad's position-that the 
erroneous deed must stand as the sole transfer-would result in Myrad's 
unjust enrichment. 213 That position would result either in requiring LaSalle 
(or some other buyer) to pay another sum for the second property, giving 
Myrad a windfall from the surplus, or leaving Myrad the owner of the 
second parcel even though it had defaulted on its note.214 The supreme court 
therefore concluded that "Myrad [would] be unjustly enriched if the 
mistaken deed to LaSalle is enforced."2 15 Since this was the case, the court 
206. !d. 
207. !d. 
208. !d. at 748--49. 
209. !d. at 749. 
210. !d. at 750--51. 
211. !d. 
212. !d. at 751. 
213. !d. at 752- 53. 
214. See id. at 752. The Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Myrad followed the rule stated 
in§ 12 of the Restatement (Third). Section 12 does not specify the remedy that should be used to 
avoid unjust enrichment, but the typical remedy would be reformation. In Myrad, the Texas 
Supreme Court spoke of rescission, assuming that once the erroneous deed was removed from 
effect the trustees would substitute one that followed the agreement of the parties. In both 
instances, restitution prevents or reverses some party 's unjust enrichment but does so by giving 
"effect to the real agreement of the parties." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND 
UNWST ENRICHMENT§ 12 cmt. b (2011). 
215 . Myrad, 300 S.W.3d at 753 . 
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stated that "[t]o avoid an unjust enrichment, we rule in favor of LaSalle and 
render judgment on its claim for rescission."21 6 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Texas Supreme Court rulings on restitution describe a generally 
applicable cause of action that the court most frequently identifies as one 
aimed at preventing unjust enrichment. This cause of action supports both 
the equitable and common law remedies in restitution. The quasi-contract 
cause of action identified by some lower Texas courts cannot, without 
stumbling over its own history, authorize equitable restitution. The Texas 
Supreme Court rulings also tend to label as unjust enrichment a general 
cause of action that is independent of tort or contract claims. Although the 
evidence is as yet unclear, the supreme court also seems to be moving away 
from an insistence on the use of the special unjust enrichment claims of 
money had and received and quantum meruit. 
These actions by the Texas Supreme Court have created a foundation 
for clarification of its unjust enrichment cause of action. That clarification 
should begin with an authoritative statement describing the elements of the 
cause of action and the breadth of its application. The court acted 
emphatically in its forceful statements in Elledge when it insisted on the 
application of the two-year statute of limitations to unjust enrichment 
claims. That same emphatic action may be necessary to clear away the 
controversy in this area. 
Those steps by the Texas Supreme Court will necessarily diminish the 
significance of the confusing terms born in the late Middle Ages to cloak 
the creation of a substantive right against unjust enrichment. Texas courts 
do not need the linguistic cover provided by quasi-contract terminology, 
and the law is better served by allowing judges and litigants to confront the 
problem of unjust enrichment directly. Speaking of liability in terms of 
unjust enrichment directs the reader to one of the core concepts of the law 
of restitution. Making such concepts more understandable will not solve 
every difficulty. Hard cases will still occur, but they will be difficult 
because of their merits, not because we do not understand our own terms. 
Using language that refers only to obsolete procedural forms, or to fictional 
justifications for expanding the jurisdiction of ancient courts, makes even 
216. !d. In First State Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, the Texas Supreme Court reformed a 
release of lien in which the bank erroneously recited the full payment of the note it held and 
cancelled its lien on a 103-acre tract. The bank intended, on the basis of a partial payment, to 
release its lien only as it was binding on other, smaller tracts. The supreme court concluded that 
"equity would reform the release so as to correct the mistake and speak the truth." See First State 
Bank of Amarillo v. Jones, 183 S.W. 874, 875- 77 (Tex. 1916). 
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easy cases harder and has no legitimate purpose. It is merely habit, and it is 
a bad one. 
APPENDIX: THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSE OF 
ACTION BY STATE* 
This appendix includes relatively recent statements by the courts of 
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia that describe the elements of 
that jurisdiction's cause of action for unjust enrichment. No statement is 
included for the state of Texas because the unsettled law of that state is the 
subject of the foregoing Article. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has also published a survey of the states on this subject, and it 
included the District of Columbia but excluded California. That survey was 
reported in Powers v. Lycoming Engines. 1 The initial decision of the district 
court in that case-to certify a plaintiff class-was reversed by the Third 
Circuit, but the reversal did not significantly alter the district court's survey 
information.2 The district court discovered that the states surveyed fell into 
four categories. The first category includes states that require satisfaction of 
the unadorned elements suggested in § 1 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Restatement (Third)): "A person who is 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in 
restitution. "3 As noted in the Article, this sentence supports the following 
elements of a general cause of action where: "(1) a benefit is conferred 
upon the defendant; (2) at the plaintiffs expense; (3) under circumstances 
that would make defendant's retention unjust. "4 The second category 
identified in the Powers case includes those states that use five elements: 
"(1) an enrichment; (2) an economic detriment or loss; (3) a connection 
between the enrichment and the impoverishment; ( 4) the absence of 
justification for the enrichment and the impoverishment; and (5) the 
absence of a legal remedy."5 The third category of states identified in 
Powers, and the largest group in the district court's survey, includes an 
additional element-that the defendant has "appreciated the benefit" and 
* Ms. Auria] Wood performed the research for this appendix. She provided a thorough 
and extensive body of material from which I created this document. I am grateful for her excellent 
work and wish to state that any errors in the use of her research are my own. 
I . Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 245 F.R.D. 226, 230-33 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
2. See Powers v. Lycoming Engines, 328 F. App'x 121, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2009). 
3. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ I (20 11 ). 
4. See Powers, 245 F.R.D at 230-31. 
5. See id. at 231. 
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"had knowledge or awareness that it was, in fact, receiving a benefit."6 The 
district court included Texas in this category.7 The reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) expressed concern that such elements caused 
unnecessary confusion and might lead to incorrect results.8 In the district 
court's fourth category are those states that describe the unjust enrichment 
claim more generally and do not delineate its elements.9 These states tend to 
follow concepts that are similar to the first category of states. 
Eleven states included in this appendix and the District of Columbia 
have clearly adopted the unadorned three elements stated above for a 
general unjust enrichment cause of action. 10 Several other states could well 
be included in this group, but their opinions lack the explicit adoption of the 
three elements. The district court in Powers placed such states in its fourth 
category. 11 Georgia and Illinois could have been omitted from this 
appendix's list of twelve for similar reasons. However, Georgia was 
included because the Second Circuit has equated its unjust enrichment 
claim with that of New York. Illinois was included because the Illinois 
Supreme Court has expressly described these three requirements for stating 
an unjust enrichment cause of action and only failed to number them. 
1. ALABAMA 
"To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must show 
that the 'defendant holds money which, in equity and good conscience, 
belongs to the plaintiff or holds money which was improperly paid to 
defendant because of mistake or fraud. "'12 
2. ALASKA 
A party seeking to recover for unjust enrichment must show (1) a 
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation 
by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance and retention by 
the defendant of such benefit under such circumstances that it would 
be inequitable for him to retain it without paying the value thereof. 13 
6. Id. 
7. !d. at 231 n.14. 
8. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment§ I cmt. d (2011). 
9. Powers, 245 F.R.D at 231. 
10. Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New Mexico, New 
York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 
11. Id. at231 n.16. 
12. See Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc. v. Heilman, 876 So. 2d 1111 , 1123 (Ala. 2003) 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Dickinson v. Cosmos Broad. Co., 782 So. 2d 260, 266 (Ala. 2000)). 
13. Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1197 (Alaska 2007). 
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3. ARIZONA 
Arizona enforces a claim of unjust enrichment when five elements are 
satisfied: "(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a connection 
between the enrichment and impoverishment, ( 4) the absence of 
justification for the enrichment and impoverishment, and ( 5) the absence of 
a remedy provided by law." 14 
4. ARKANSAS 
"In short, an action based on unjust enrichment is maintainable where 
a person has received money or its equivalent under such circumstances 
that, in equity and good conscience, he or she ought not to retain. " 15 
5. CALIFORNIA 
"Under the law of restitution, an individual may be required to make 
restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another." 16 
6. COLORADO 
The test for recovery under an unjust enrichment theory requires a 
showing that (1) at plaintiffs expense (2) defendant received a 
benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for 
defendant to retain the benefit without paying. The scope of the 
remedy is broad, cutting across both contract and tort law, with its 
application guided by the underlying principle of avoiding the unjust 
enrichment of one party at the expense of another. 17 
14. Freeman v. Sorchych, 245 P.3d 927, 936 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). 
15. Campbell v. Asbury Auto., Inc., 381 S.W.3d 21, 36 (Ark. 2011). 
16. Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 924 P.2d 996, 1003 (Cal. 1996). Cf McBride v. Boughton, 20 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 122 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("The fact that one person benefits another is 
not, by itself, sufficient to require restitution." (quoting First Nationwide Savings v. Perry, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 173, 176 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1992))); Davenport v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 725 F. 
Supp. 2d 862, 885- 86 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (explaining the narrow view of unjust enrichment and 
particular instances where it supports restitution). But see Munoz v. MacMillan, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
664, 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ("no freestanding cause of action for" unjust enrichment); 
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 815 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (restitution can remedy other 
causes of action, but "unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action under California 
law"). 
17. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1007 (Colo. 2008) (citation 
omitted); see also Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (upholding the rule in 
Robinson). 
268 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:225 
7. CONNECTICUT 
"Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must prove (1) that 
the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay 
the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the 
plaintiffs' detriment." 18 
8. DELAWARE 
"The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) an enrichment, (2) an 
impoverishment, (3) a relation between the enrichment and 
impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification, and (5) the absence of a 
remedy provided by law."19 
9. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
"Unjust enrichment occurs when: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit 
on the defendant; (2) the defendant retains the benefit; and (3) under the 
circumstances, the defendant's retention of the benefit is unjust."20 
10. FLORIDA 
"The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are 'a benefit conferred 
upon a defendant by the plaintiff, the defendant's appreciation of the 
benefit, and the defendant's acceptance and retention of the benefit under 
circumstances that make it inequitable for him to retain it without paying 
the value thereof. "'21 
11. GEORGIA 
"Unjust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal 
contract, but when the party sought to be charged has been conferred a 
18. Town of New Hartford v. Conn. Res. Recovery Auth., 970 A.2d 592, 609 (Conn. 2009) 
(quoting Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 649 A.2d 518, 522 
(Conn. 1994)). 
19. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1130 (Del. 2010). 
20. Peart v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 972 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C. 2009) (quoting News World 
Commc'ns, Inc., v. Thompsen, 878 A.2d 1218, 1222 (D.C. 2005)). 
21. Fla. Power Corp. v. City of Winter Park, 887 So. 2d 1237, 1241 n.4 (Fla. 2004) 
(quoting Ruck Bros. Brick, Inc. v. Kellogg & Kimsey, Inc., 668 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
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benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the benefitted 
party equitably ought to return or compensate for. ,m 
12. HAWAII 
It is a truism that "[a] person confers a benefit upon another if he 
gives to the other possession of or some other interest in money, land, 
chattels, or choses in action, . . . or in any way adds to the other's 
security or advantage." One who receives a benefit is of course 
enriched, and he would be unjustly enriched if its retention would be 
unjust. And it is axiomatic that "[a] person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to 
the other.'m 
13. IDAHO 
"The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred 
on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; 
and (3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit 
without payment of the value of the benefit."24 
14. ILLINOIS 
"To state a cause of action based on a theory of unjust enrichment, a 
plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the 
plaintiffs detriment, and that defendant's retention of the benefit violates 
the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience."25 
15. INDIANA 
"To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must establish 
that a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such 
circumstances that the defendant's retention of the benefit without payment 
22. Tuvim v. United Jewish Cmtys. Inc., 680 S.E.2d 827, 829- 30 (Ga. 2009) (quoting 
Engram v. Engram, 463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (Ga. 1995)); see also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 
163, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2012) (New York and Georgia law both require for a claim for unjust 
enrichment that the plaintiff show the defendant obtained a benefit at his expense and that equity 
and good conscience require defendant to return it to the plaintiff). 
23. Small v. Badenhop, 701 P.2d 647, 654 (Haw. 1985) (quoting Restatement of 
Restitution§ 1 & cmts. a, b (1937)); Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc., 100 P.3d 60, 72- 73 
(Haw. 2004). 
24. Teton Peaks Inv. Co. v. Ohme, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Idaho 2008). 
25. HPI Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ill. 
1989). 
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would be unjust."26 A claim in quantum meruit appears to be one 
application of the claim for unjust enrichment.27 
16. IOWA 
Recovery based on unjust enrichment can be distilled into three basic 
elements of recovery. They are: (1) defendant was enriched by the 
receipt of a benefit; (2) the enrichment was at the expense of the 
plaintiff; and (3) it is unjust to allow the defendant to retain the 
benefit under the circumstances.28 
17. KANSAS 
"[W]e [have] explained that unjust enrichment arises when (1) a 
benefit has been conferred upon the defendant, (2) the defendant retains the 
benefit, and (3) under the circumstances, the defendant's retention of the 
benefit is unjust."29 
18. KENTUCKY 
"For a party to prevail under the theory of unjust enrichment, she must 
prove three elements: '(1) benefit conferred upon defendant at plaintiffs 
expense; (2) a resulting appreciation of benefit by defendant; and (3) 
inequitable retention of benefit without payment for its value. "'30 
19. LOUISIANA 
A cause of action for "enrichment without cause" was adopted by the 
1995 Louisiana Legislature as LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298, and provides as 
follows: 
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of 
another person is bound to compensate that person. The term 
"without cause" is used in this context to exclude cases in which the 
enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law. The remedy 
declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law 
26. Zoeller v. E. Chi. Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind. 2009). 
27. See Woodruffv. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 791 (Ind. 2012). 
28. State ex rei. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154- 55 (Iowa 2001) (footnote 
omitted). 
29. Estate of Draper v. Bank of Am., 205 P.3d 698, 706 (Kan. 2009). 
30. Guerin v. Fulkerson, 354 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Jones v. 
Sparks, 297 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009)). 
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provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a 
contrary rule. 
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to 
which one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, 
whichever is less. 
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of 
the time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of 
the time the judgment is rendered.31 
Prior to the enactment of the above article, which codified the 
existing law, this court established five requirements for proving 
unjust enrichment, as follows: "(1) there must be an enrichment; (2) 
there must be an impoverishment; (3) there must be a connection 
between the enrichment and the resulting impoverishment; ( 4) there 
must be an absence of 'justification' or 'cause' for the enrichment 
and impoverishment; and (5) there must be no other remedy at law 
available to plaintiff."32 
20. MAINE 
We have consistently held that a claim for unjust enrichment is 
established with proof that (1) the claimant "conferred a benefit on" 
the receiving party, (2) the receiving party "had appreciation or 
knowledge of the benefit," and (3) "acceptance or retention of the 
benefit was under circumstances that make it inequitable for [the 
receiving party] to retain the benefit without payment of its value."33 
21. MARYLAND 
Unjust enrichment consists of three elements: 1. A benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2. An appreciation or knowledge 
by the defendant of the benefit; and 3. The acceptance or retention by 
the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the 
f . l 34 payment o tts va ue. 
31. Indus. Cos. v. Durbin, 837 So.2d 1207, 1213 (La. 2003). 
32. !d. at 1213-14 (quoting Carriere v. Bank ofLa., 702 So. 2d 648, 651 (La. 1996)). 
33. Estate of Anderson, 988 A.2d 977, 980 (Me. 2010) (quoting Estate of Miller, 960 A.2d 
1140, 1147 (Me. 2008)). 
34. Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343, 351 (Md. 2007). 
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22. MASSACHUSETTS 
"Restitution is an equitable remedy by which a person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to repay the injured 
party."35 "An equitable remedy for unjust enrichment is not available to a 
party with an adequate remedy at law."36 
23 . MICHIGAN 
"Even though no contract may exist between two parties, under the 
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, '[a] person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the 
other. "'37 "In order to sustain the claim of unjust enrichment, plaintiff must 
establish (I) the receipt of a benefit by defendant from plaintiff, and (2) an 
inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by 
defendant. "38 
24. MINNESOTA 
"To establish an unjust enrichment claim, the claimant must show that 
the defendant has knowingly received or obtained something of value for 
which the defendant 'in equity and good conscience' should pay."39 "A 
party may not have equitable relief where there is an adequate remedy at 
law available. "40 
25. MISSISSIPPI 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim and is defmed as: "Money 
paid to another by mistake of fact .... The ground on which recovery 
is allowed is that one receiving money paid to him by mistake should 
not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the party who paid 
the money to him by retaining it, but in equity and good conscience 
should refund it."41 
35. Keller v. O'Brien, 683 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Mass. 1997). 
36. Santagate v. Tower, 833 N.E.2d 171 , 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
37. Kammer Asphalt Paving Co. v. E. China Twp. Schs., 504 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Mich. 
1993) (quoting Restatement of Restitution§ 1 (1937)). 
38. Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit, 666 N.W.2d 271, 280 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). 
39. ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. 
1996). 
40. !d. at 305. 
41. Willis v. Rehab Solutions, PLLC, 82 So. 3d 583, 588 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Union 
Nat'! Life. Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 11 75, 11 80 (Miss. 2004)). The court also labeled this 
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26. MISSOURI 
"Unjust enrichment requires a showing that: '(l) [the plaintiff] 
conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant appreciated the 
benefit; and (3) the defendant accepted and retained the benefit under 
inequitable and/or unjust circumstances. "'42 
27. MONTANA 
"The doctrine of unjust enrichment represents an equitable means of 
preventing one party from benefitting from his or her wrongful acts and 
requires a showing of misconduct or fault to recover. "43 
28. NEBRASKA 
Appellants' remaining claims seek money for unjust enrichment that 
Visa and MasterCard allegedly received from the purportedly inflated 
prices for retail goods that appellants paid. To recover on such a 
claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant received money, 
(2) the defendant retained possession of the money, and (3) the 
defendant in justice and fairness ought to pay the money to the 
1 . ' ff44 p amh . 
29. NEVADA 
The Nevada Supreme Court implied that recovery based on the 
"doctrine of unjust enrichment" was required where one person possessed 
money or property, which "in good conscience and justice" should be paid 
or delivered to another.45 
30. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
"A plaintiff is entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment if the 
defendant received a benefit and it would be unconscionable for the 
unjust enriclunent claim as one for money had and received. !d. This case therefore leaves open a 
question of the general applicability of the state's unjust enriclunent claim. 
42. Hargis v. JLB Corp., 357 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Mo. 2011) (en bane) (quoting Howard v. 
Turnbull, 316 S.W.3d 431 ,436 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)). 
43. LeFeber v. Johnson, 209 P.3d 254, 260 (Mont. 2009). 
44. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 723 N.W.2d 293, 302 (Neb. 2006). In earlier decisions, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court also identified this as a money-had-and-received claim. This case 
therefore leaves open a question of the general applicability of the state's unjust enrichment claim. 
45 . LeasePartners Corp. v. Robert L. Brooks Trust Dated Nov. 12, 1975, 942 P.2d 182, 187 
(Nev. 1997). 
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defendant to retain that benefit."46 However, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire in a recent decision recited this language, but added the 
following: "[A]nd unjust enrichment generally does not form an 
independent basis for a cause of action."47 
31. NEW JERSEY 
To establish unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show both that 
defendant received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without 
payment would be unjust. The unjust enrichment doctrine requires 
that plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the defendant 
at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that 
the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual 
~~~ . 
32. NEW MEXICO 
"To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, 'one must show that: (1) 
another has been knowingly benefitted at one's expense (2) in a manner 
such that allowance of the other to retain the benefit would be unjust. "'49 
33. NEWYORK 
The New York Court of Appeals has stated that in order to allege an 
unjust enrichment claim, "[a] plaintiff must show 'that (1) the other party 
was enriched, (2) at that party's expense, and (3) that "it is against equity 
and good conscience to permit [the other party] to retain what is sought to 
be recovered.""'50 
46. Nat' I Emp't Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401 , 406 (N.H. 2000). 
47. See Gen. Insulation Co. v. Eckman Constr., 992 A.2d 613, 621 (N.H. 2010). The court 
failed to explain the meaning of "an independent basis for a cause of action," but its source for 
that quote went on to explain that restitution is not warranted if services or benefits are provided 
gratuitously or officiously. See 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 10 (2007). 
48. VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 641 A.2d 519, 526 (N.J. 1994) (citations omitted). 
49. City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 260 P.3d 414, 428- 29 (N.M. 2011) (quoting 
Ontiveros Insulation Co. v. Sanchez, 3 P.3d 695, 698 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)). 
50. Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 944 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (N.Y. 2011) (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Walker, 787 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004), abrogated on other grounds by Butler v. Catinella, 868 N.Y.S.2d 101 , 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008)); see Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 675 F.3d 163, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2012) (New York and Georgia 
law both require for a claim of unjust enrichment that the plaintiff show the defendant obtained a 
benefit at his expense and that equity and good conscience require the defendant to return it to the 
plaintiff). 
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34. NORTH CAROLINA 
In order to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a party must have 
conferred a benefit on the other party. The benefit must not have been 
conferred officiously, that is it must not be conferred by an 
interference in the affairs of the other party in a manner that is not 
justified in the circumstances. The benefit must not be gratuitous and 
it must be measurable? 
"Under a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must establish certain 
essential elements: (1) a measurable benefit was conferred on the defendant, 
(2) the defendant consciously accepted that benefit, and (3) the benefit was 
not conferred officiously or gratuitously."52 
35. NORTH DAKOTA 
"Unjust enrichment requires: (1) an enrichment; (2) an 
impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the 
impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification for the enrichment and 
impoverishment; and ( 5) an absence of remedy provided by law. "53 
36. OHIO 
After noting that restitution was the remedy used to prevent unjust 
enrichment, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that to obtain restitution, one 
"must demonstrate (1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant; 
(2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) retention of the 
benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to 
do so without payment ('unjust enrichment')."54 
37. OKLAHOMA 
Unjust enrichment is a condition which results from the failure of a 
party to make restitution in circumstances where it is inequitable; i.e. 
the party has money in its hands that, in equity and good conscience, 
it should not be allowed to retain. Where the plaintiff has an adequate 
51. Booe v. Shadrick, 369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (N.C. 1988). 
52. Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. James Massengill & Sons Constr. Co., 712 S.E.2d 670, 677 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
53. Ritter, Laber & Assocs., Inc. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 680 N.W.2d 634, 642 (N.D. 2004). 
54. Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 834 N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ohio 2005). 
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remedy at law, the court will not ordinarily exercise its equitable 
jurisdiction to grant relief for unjust enrichment. 55 
38. OREGON 
The Oregon Supreme Court has described the elements of a 
substantive unjust enrichment claim as the basis of the remedy of 
constructive trust. The plaintiff must show that the defendant obtained her 
property under circumstances that made his possession wrongful or 
inequitable. 56 
39. PENNSYLVANIA 
"Where one party has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another, 
he is required to make restitution to the other. In order to recover, there 
must be both (1) an enrichment, and (2) an injustice resulting if recovery for 
the enrichment is denied. "57 
40. RHODE ISLAND 
A claim for unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) the 
plaintiff must confer a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant must 
appreciate the benefit, and (3) the defendant must accept the benefit in such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable to retain the benefit without 
paying the value thereof. 58 
41. SOUTH CAROLINA 
To recover on a theory of restitution, the plaintiff must show (1) that 
he conferred a non-gratuitous benefit on the defendant; (2) that the 
defendant realized some value from the benefit; and (3) that it would 
be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying 
the plaintiff for its value. 59 
55 . Harvell v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Okla. 2006) (footnote 
omitted). 
56. See Tupper v. Roan, 243 P.3d 50, 58 (Or. 2010) (en bane). 
57. Meehan v. Cheltenham Twp. , 189 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1963). This statement was quoted 
and used in Ira G. SteffY & Son, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pa., 7 A.3d 278, 283 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010). 
58. 
59. 
See Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 99 (R.I. 2006). 
Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth., 581 S.E.2d 161, 167 (S.C. 2003). 
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42. SOUTH D AKOTA 
"For [the plaintiff] to prevail on his claim of unjust enrichment, he 
must show: (1) [the defendant] received a benefit; (2) [the defendant] was 
aware he was receiving a benefit, and (3) that it is inequitable to allow [the 
defendant] to retain this benefit without paying for it."60 
43. TENNESSEE 
[W]e conclude that to recover for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff need 
not establish that the defendant received a direct benefit from the 
plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may recover for unjust enrichment against 
a defendant who receives any benefit from the plaintiff if the 
defendant's retention of the benefit would be unjust. Our conclusion 
is consistent with other jurisdictions that have also concluded that the 
benefit received by a defendant need not be direct to establish an 
unjust enrichment claim.61 
44. UTAH 
A claim for unjust enrichment in Utah requires proof of three 
elements: "(I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an 
appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the 
acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value."62 
45. V ERMONT 
"In evaluating unjust-enrichment claims, courts consider 'whether, in 
light of the totality of circumstances, it is against equity and good 
conscience to allow defendant to retain what is sought to be recovered. "'63 
46. VIRGINIA 
To state a cause of action for unjust enrichment, [the plaintiff] had to 
allege that: (1) he conferred a benefit on [the defendant]; (2) [the 
defendant] knew of the benefit and should reasonably have expected 
60. Hofeldt v. Mehling, 658 N.W.2d 783, 788 (S.D. 2003). 
61. Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chern. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 525 (Tenn. 2005). 
62. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 240 P.3d 754, 763 (Utah 2010) (quoting Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998)). 
63. Savage v. Walker, 969 A.2d 121 , 124 (Vt. 2009) (quoting Legault v. Legault, 459 A.2d 
980, 984 (Vt. 1983)). 
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to repay [the plaintiff]; and (3) [the defendant] accepted or retained 
the benefit without paying for its value.64 
47. WASHINGTON 
After finding that unjust enrichment was the modem phrase for quasi-
contracts or contracts implied in law, the Washington Supreme Court stated 
that "the elements of a contract implied in law are: (1) the defendant 
receives a benefit, (2) the received benefit is at the plaintiffs expense, and 
(3) the circumstances make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without payment. "65 
48. WEST VIRGINIA 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia allows a general right 
to restitution upon proof that the defendant has mistakenly paid money to 
another, and justifies that remedy on the conclusion that the payee would be 
unjustly enriched under those circumstances. 66 
49. WISCONSIN 
[T]he essential elements of quasi contract entitling one to judgment 
for unjust enrichment are: 1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant 
by the plaintiff; 2. Appreciation by the defendant of the fact of such 
benefit; 3. Acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit, 
under circumstances such that it would be inequitable to retain the 
benefit without payment of the value thereof. 67 
50. WYOMING 
One who seeks relief based on unjust enrichment must prove all of 
the following four elements: (1) Valuable services were rendered, or 
materials furnished, (2) to the party to be charged, (3) which services 
or materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party to be 
charged, and ( 4) that the services or materials were furnished under 
such circumstances as would reasonably notify the party to be 
64. Schmidt v. Household Fin. Corp., II, 661 S.E.2d 834, 838 (Va. 2008). 
65. Young v. Young, 191 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 2008) (en bane). 
66. See Hill v. Stowers, 680 S.E.2d 66, 75 (W. Va. 2009). 
67. Lawlis v. Thompson, 405 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Wis. 1987) (quoting Nelson v. Preston, 55 
N.W.2d 918, 920 (Wis. 1952)); see also Staver v. Milwaukee Cnty., 712 N.W.2d 387, 393 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
2012] APPENDIX: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 279 
charged that the plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing 
such materials, expected to be paid by the party to be charged. 68 
68. Nuhome Invs. , LLC v. Weller, 81 P.3d 940, 948 (Wyo. 2003). 
